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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with nationality and belonging in the context of a Palestinian community in 
Egypt. A central concept in the theory is the discourse of “belonging as nationality”. I use this term 
to describe all the discursive practises that together have the effect of equalling belonging with 
nationality. Within this discourse belonging is interpreted as nationality and nothing else. 
 In my analysis I argue that the discourse of “belonging as nationality” has a big impact on 
Palestinians in Egypt, because it has been instrumental in determining the laws and regulations 
which govern their lives. The Palestinians have been constructed as guests in Egypt, and thus they 
have not been given Egyptian citizenship and they are treated as foreigners in Egyptian law. Their 
are constructed as people that belong in Palestine, and giving them right in Egypt is seen as a threat 
to this construction. 
 I also analyse the ways in which the members of a Palestinian community in Egypt is 
actively using the discourse of “belonging as nationality” in some situations and discarding it or 
even resisting it in other situations. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
During the autumn of 2009 I spent two months doing fieldwork in Egypt. The stories I heard during 
this time were a strong testimony to the situations of the Palestinians in Egypt. I heard of an old 
man in prison for having the wrong nationality and a young man detained for showing the wrong 
papers. A young boy that had to quit school because he could not afford to pay the fees that no one 
else has to pay and a young woman that cannot follow the tuition in her university for the same 
reason. Grown ups that are banned from formal work, and children that are told that they do not 
belong in the country where they are living. The stories are about people whose nationality is 
limiting their opportunities, but also people who are proud of who their nation. They are people who 
dedicate their time to Palestinian institutions working for the Palestinian people and the Palestinian 
cause, and people who spend hours teaching and being taught about Palestinian cultural heritage 
and traditions.  
 
I have chosen to write my thesis about nationality in the case of a Palestinian community in Egypt. 
Nationality is a very central concept in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, yet it has received relatively 
little attention compared with other concepts like for example religion. Nationality is a term that is 
used to describe big groups of people with a common history, language and culture, and nationality 
is inherited from parents to children together with the national characteristics. According to the 
nationalist discourse every nation has a right to a sovereign state on its own territory, and this is at 
the centre of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Israeli state makes claim to its territory as the 
territory of the Jewish nation, while the Palestinians who are living in that land, or where living 
there prior to 1948, do not acknowledge this claim. 
Another central aspect of the conflict is the millions of Palestinian refugees from the many 
wars between Israel and the surrounding Arab states that are hindered from returning to their homes. 
According to Kagan (2007, p5):  
“Palestinian refugees are unable to return not because they are in danger at the places of 
origin (the classic condition of a refugee), but because the new government there has 
simply decided as a matter of policy to forbid their return”. 
A majority of Palestinian refugees live in Gaza or the West Bank, or in camps in surrounding Arab 
countries, most notably Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. While some research have been done on these 
refugees, almost no research is done on the approximately 70 000 Palestinians currently living in Egypt. 
These people live dispersed around the country and mixed with the Egyptian population, not in refugee 
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camps. They have little in common except for their Palestinian background. Many of them have been 
living in Egypt their whole life, indeed a substantial number of families have been living there since the 
war of 1948 (ElAbed 2009). What is it that makes these people Palestinian and not Egyptian? 
 The labels we choose to give to specific people are dependent upon the discourses we use to 
interpret the world, and these discourses are again determined by political relations. In my thesis I will 
study a discourse I have entitled “belonging as nationality”, which is a set of discursive actions that 
constructs belonging as a question of nationality and nothing else. Central to this discourse is the 
concepts of home-land and host-country. A persons homeland is the land where the person belongs 
according to his or her nationality, any other country where the person might reside will be merely a 
host-country, in other words a country where he or she might live for a period of time as a guest, but he 
or she will never belong there or be fully integrated into the country. 
Research question: 
The thesis seeks to answer the following question: 
 How is the discourse of “belonging as nationality” experienced and used within a Palestinian 
community in Egypt? 
This research question is both theoretically and socially relevant. It is theoretically relevant because 
it opens up for a new perspective on studying nationality, through a new case. It is socially relevant 
because it touches upon socially important issues, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the 
problem of stateless refugees. 
In addition to the main research question, I have two sub-questions that I have used to give the 
analysis further direction and narrow the focus down to the most important issues: 
 How has the discourse of "belonging as nationality" been used to describe and determine the 
relations of Palestinians living in Egypt to Palestine and Egypt? 
 How are my interviewees experiencing and reacting to “belonging as nationality” in their 
daily life 
My analysis consists of three chapters. The first chapter serves as an introduction to the case, and 
the two following chapters are discussing the two sub-questions separately. 
 The conditions of the Palestinians in Egypt are to some extent determined by Egypt’s role in 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The time after 1948 was characterized by the Egyptian authorities 
support for the Palestinian cause. They were instrumental in the early Arab wars against Israel, and 
propagators behind the establishment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). It was very 
important to the Egyptian authorities that the Palestinians kept their Palestinian nationality, as this 
was seen as a precondition for their return, yet in the period of Abd ElNasser’s government they 
were treated on a par with Egyptian nationals. With the signing of the Camp David Agreements 
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between Egypt and Israel, and Egypt’s subsequent reorientation towards the West and Israel, 
relations between the Egyptian authorities and the PLO deteriorated dramatically. This had dramatic 
impact on the Palestinians in Egypt. The government still denied them Egyptian citizenship, but at 
the same time they withdrew all regulations that treated them as Egyptian nationals, and from the 
late 70’s Palestinians in Egypt have been treated as foreigners by the laws. The first of my analysis 
chapter discusses further the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Palestinian immigration to 
Egypt and the present Palestinian community in Egypt. 
 In my thesis, I argue that the discourse of “belonging as nationality” has been instrumental 
in determining the government’s treatment of the Palestinians in Egypt. This might not be intended 
by the government, but it is definitely important for how both ElAbed (2009) and my interviewees 
describe the situation. This is also true for the Israeli regulations that hinder Palestinian refugees 
from returning to their previous homes. In this way my interviewees experienced that the discourse 
of “belonging as nationality” was forced upon them from above by the Egyptian authority, the 
Israeli authority, and even the PLO-institutions. I include the PLO-institutions together with the 
Egyptian and Israeli authorities, because representatives of the PLO-institutions that I spoke with 
during my fieldwork in Cairo were insisting that no Palestinians should be given any other 
citizenship than the Palestinian, because this would compromise the right to return. In this they 
interpret the Palestinian situation through the discourse of "belonging as nationality", and because 
of their position in the Palestinian community that was the focus of my study, they have the power 
to make this interpretation the leading interpretation within the community. 
 My interviewees also used the discourse actively to interpret their own situation, but they 
only used it when it could provide them with satisfying explanations. In other instances they 
discarded the discourse, or even directly opposed it. The direct opposition to the discourse was not 
explicit in their opinions. They were careful not to criticize the government or the PLO-institutions, 
yet by telling me about their grievances they let me know that the situation was far from good. And 
even though they usually did not blame the government for the situation, it is easy to see that the 
government is to blame for making the rules that led directly to the grievances they told me about. 
  
Among the very few recently concluded studies on Palestinians in Egypt, the most notable was 
published by Oroub El Abed in 2009. This study is concerned with the rights and livelihoods of 
Palestinians residing in Egypt, but it is not concerned with issues of their nationality, except when it 
is directly intercepting with their rights. In addition to this study, a few minor studies have been 
done, but no major studies have been published on the nationality of Palestinians in Egypt. Because 
of the huge diversity within among the Palestinians in Egypt, and the relatively small scope of my 
thesis, I have limited my studies to a relatively small, but important, community of Palestinians in 
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Cairo. 
 During a two months fieldwork in Cairo, Egypt, I interviewed 15 people within the 
community. The interviews were relatively unstructured, and the interviewees were free to speak 
about  issues that were important to them at the same task as I had some questions that all the 
interviewees answered. In addition I was present in the community on several occasions. Towards 
the end of my fieldwork I also spent some time with some of my interviewees apart from the 
interview situation. My study builds primarily on the formal interviews, but being present in the 
community, together with my previous knowledge of Egypt, has also been important for my general 
understanding of the case. In 2007 I spent 4 months studying Arabic in Cairo, and when I returned 
to do my fieldwork, I was reminded how different this city is from every other place I have been. 
Especially the legal system strikes me as significantly different. The Egyptian police forces are 
severely dysfunctional, and corruption plays an important role, yet violence is uncommon and street 
fights almost non-existent. It seems to me that ensuring public safety and nonviolence has the 
highest priority, while the enforcement of general laws is highly arbitrary and to a certain extent 
depending on personal relations between the law enforcement and those who are found breaking the 
law. 
Theoretical approach 
My study is grounded in an understanding of the world built on social constructivism. I believe that 
in order to understand the world, we have to interpret it through pre-existing categories that have 
developed through centuries. Within social constructivism, one of the most important tools to make 
sense of the world is representations. A representation is a word or another symbol that refers to 
something else, in the way the world apple refers to the object we have named apple. Because we 
can only use words, not actual objects, to think and speak with, the world is only available for us 
through the representations. Because of this, the way we represent the world is vital for how we 
understand it, and for all production of knowledge. 
 A discourse is a specific system of representations that makes some thoughts possible and 
logical while others become illogical or even impossible. One such discourse is the nationalist 
discourse. Within the nationalist discourse, the division of the world into nations has become 
naturalized, and from this follows that every man should belong to a nation and stay in his national 
homeland. Because of the hegemonic status of the nationalist discourse, it is difficult to imagine a 
world without nations, but the increase in migration during the last few decades makes the claim 
that every man should stay in his national home-land less and less viable. 
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Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 of the thesis is the theory chapter. This chapter starts with an outline of various theories 
of representation and discourses. Important issues in this part includes different ways of 
representing groups, such as stereotyping and differentiating between ones own group and the 
others, and positionality within the discourse, or the way discourses contain a set of roles that 
people can act within. I will also touch upon the power aspect of discourses and representations. 
 The second part of the chapter is problematizing the concept of nation within a perspective 
of representations and discourses. The chapter starts by discussing some discursive aspects of the 
nation, and continues with a short summary of the history of the nation. Further it discusses such 
issues as the relationship between nationality and citizenship, and the concepts of home-and and 
host-country. Especially important is the interpretation of migration that these concepts facilitates 
and the discursive construction of belonging that follows from them. In the end of the chapter I 
introduce the discourse of "belonging as nationality", and I identify a set of discursive practices that 
equals belonging with nationality. 
 The thesis' 3
rd
  chapter is the methods chapter. This chapter starts by describing the research-
design and fieldwork. That part is important because it allows the reader some insight into how the 
data was collected and the effects this might have had on the data obtained. I present this part by 
giving an account of the different choice I did before and during my fieldwork. This way I can 
explain both why I made the choices I made and how the process might have affected the data 
gathering. 
 The next part of the chapter is considering the choices I did during the analysis. I describe 
how I went through with the analysis, and elaborate on some important decisions. At last I discuss 
the presentation of the findings, expanding on issues such as presenting the interviewees vs. the 
opinions of the researcher and securing the anonymity of the interviewees in the presentation. The 
chapter ends with a note on the credibility and transferability of the research findings. 
 Chapter 4 is titled A Background on the Palestinians in Egypt. This chapter starts with a 
history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In this account I emphasizes issues such as Egypt's role in 
the conflict and Palestinian immigration to Egypt as a result of the conflict. This gives the reader an 
insight into the premises for the growth of a Palestinian community in Egypt. Continuing on this, 
the chapter expands on the present Palestinians in Egypt, and the role of the PLO-institutions in 
organizing them. 
 Chapter 5 is called The Political construction of host-country and home-land. The title is 
referring to the role of political considerations in describing and determining the relations of the 
Palestinians to both Egypt and Palestine. The chapter starts by discussing the relations of the 
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Palestinians to Egypt, as they are stated in Egyptian law and interpreted by my interviewees. The 
next part is discussing the relations of the Palestinians in Egypt to Palestine, and how these are 
affected by Israeli laws. The whole chapter builds on stories about how the Palestinians are treated 
in Egypt and when they try to return to Palestine. Central issues are those of citizenship, residence 
permits, work permits and education in Egypt, and the possibilities to visit or settle in Palestine. 
 The last analysis chapter is chapter 6, Living in Between and the struggle for belonging. This 
chapter concerns how my interviewees is using the discourse of "belonging as nationality" 
themselves. The chapter first looks into how my interviewees use the discourse to interpret their 
own experiences. Then it goes on to discuss the situations in which the interviewees prefer to use 
other discourses, either on the side of "belonging as nationality", or in direct opposition to it. 
 The conclusion of my thesis will go back to the research question. I will first present the 
findings of all the previous chapters, chapter by chapter. Then I will discuss how the findings from 
these chapters is contributing towards answering the research question. I will end my thesis with 
some remarks on the theoretical insight that can be gained from the analysis of the case and a few 
remarks on the possibilities to find a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in light of my 
studies. 
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Chapter 2: 
Theory 
In order to make sense of the world we live in, we interpret it. We automatically interpret everything 
that happens to us within the limits of our prior knowledge, and our interpretations go on to shape 
both our knowledge and future events. In other words, everything that happens to us is adding to 
our general knowledge of the world, but we can also learn by observing or by being taught by 
others. When a specific interpretation of an event is shared by a group of people, that interpretation 
will be regarded as knowledge, and the knowledge will be shared by the whole group. If one person 
chooses another interpretation, she has to convince the other persons in the group that this 
interpretation is better than the one they previously believed in, or her interpretation will be 
regarded as false by the group. It will not achieve the status of knowledge before it is accepted by a 
majority of the group. In this way knowledge is socially constructed (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999, 
Hall 1997). 
 According to Hall (1997), we are depending upon representation to interpret the world, and 
thus create knowledge. A representation is a symbol that is used to represent something else, in the 
way the word apple is used to represent the physical item we have named apple. The word in itself 
does not have any of the characteristics of an apple. We cannot eat it, but we use it to think with and 
to communicate with other people. Discourse theory is describing how we use representations 
systematically, and how the systems of representations shape our thinking and interpretations. A 
discourse is a specific system of representations, and within a discourse certain interpretations and 
actions are made likely, while others seem impossible. 
 Within the nationalist discourse, people naturally belong in groups, and these groups belong 
to specific territories. The groups are permanent groups which share the same language, culture and 
history. If a new person comes to the territory of one national group, he does not share that 
language, culture and history, and cannot become a member of the group. The group belongs to the 
territory, but the new person does not, and can only stay there as a guest as long as he is accepted by 
the group. 
 In this chapter, I will first elaborate further on the theories of representations and discourses. 
Secondly I will use these theories to discuss the concepts of nationality, belonging, home-land and 
host-country. I will discuss both what others have been writing about these concepts, and how they 
together constitute a nationalist discourse. In my analysis I will discuss how this discourse is used 
within the case of a Palestinian community in Egypt. 
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Representations: 
By representations we mean the way something is representing, or make us think about something 
else. For example our language is made up of words that are representing things, feelings, actions 
and so on. The words become symbols representing the things, actions and feelings, but not only 
words can be symbols. In our daily life we are surrounded by symbols of different kinds, like for 
example traffic lights, where the red and green lights are symbols telling us if we should stop or 
drive on.   But representations can also mean that small and simple things can be symbols 
representing something much bigger, in the way that a small cross is often use as a symbol to 
represent the Christian religion (Hall 1997).  
 Symbols are directing attention to what they are representing, but they can also be used to 
hide things, because when you draw attention to one aspect of a case other aspects automatically 
fall into the shadow of that aspect. For example politicians often use words that are highlighting the 
positive aspects of their actions, thus hiding the negative (Fairclough 2003, Jørgensen & Phillips 
1999). For example the difference between freedom fighters and terrorists is not so much about any 
difference in the fighter’s methods as about who you are supporting. That is also why an 
organization can be seen as a terrorist organization at one point of time, and later be seen as 
freedom fighters, or the other way around. Think only about how the image of ANC changed from a 
terrorist organization (Byford 2002), to an organization whose leader won the Nobel peace prize 
after the fall of apartheid in South Africa in 1994. 
 One of the first scholars to explore the significance of language in representation was 
Saussure, who was a pioneer within linguistics. He named the symbols signifiers and the things they 
where representing signified, and he claimed that the relationship between the signifiers and the 
signified where completely arbitrary (Hall 1997). This can be seen by looking at different 
languages, which have different names for the same things. However the relationship between the 
different signifiers is not arbitrary, in fact the signifiers only get their meaning in relationship with 
other signifiers that together create a language system. Saussure called this system "Langue", and 
the use of language "parole". Langue is shared within a group of people, thus making parole 
possible. Just think about how communication with other people is depending on sharing their 
language, and how difficult it is to communicate with people that do not share your language 
(Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). 
 Later scholars have maintained big parts of Saussure’s theories, but they have emphasized 
that, like parole is depending on langue for its existence, langue is also depending on parole. For a 
language to develop it is depending on the people using it, and it can also be changed through that 
use, but if people stop using a language it will die (Jørgensen &Phillips 1999). Because parole only 
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exists within specific contexts, the development of language is also happening within these 
contexts, and should be studied within the contexts. This is valid not only for language, but for all 
symbols and representations. 
 What Saussure called langue is relatively similar to what Hall (1997) terms systems of 
representations. In these systems, symbols are organized and classified according to each other 
much like signifiers is organized according to each other in Saussure’s langue. The systems of 
representations then adjoin to make conceptual maps that we use to orientate with in order to 
interpret the symbols. According to Hall these maps are held by individuals, but they have big 
similarities that make us able to understand each other. 
 An important part of these systems are the way we classify the concepts within different 
categories. This is important in order to make us able to use them as effectively as possible. This 
automatic classification makes us able to build new knowledge on top of old knowledge, so that we 
do not have to learn everything from scratch each time we see something new. For example, when 
going into a shop where you have never been before, you will still be able to find most of the things 
you want, because you have classified items as belonging together, so that when you find one type 
of cold drinks, you know that you are likely to find other cold drinks nearby. When we classify 
something, we do it based on the characteristics of the thing, but not only on the characteristics it 
inhabits. We classify things just as much according to the characteristics they do not inhabit, and 
how they are different from other things (Hall 1997).  
 Hooks (2001) is concerned with how such categories affect the relationship between people. 
Just as we are putting things into categories, we are also putting people into categories according to 
their assumed characteristics. Hooks studied how white youths in Great Britain were building their 
own identity in relation to youths with other ethnic backgrounds. When we put people into 
categories in this way, we effectively group them together. And as with other categories, groups of 
people are defined just as much because of what they are not, as because of what they are. Singh 
(1999) is highlighting this by showing us how two groups of people might be seen as separate in 
one context, but in another context they are seen as just one group. For example a Scottish man 
might represent himself as different from an English man, but if a Scott and an Englishman are in a 
competition against a German, they would be likely to identify themselves as British so as to fall 
into the same category.  
Because groups are socially constructed they are not eternal. On this background Jørgensen 
& Phillips (1999) are claiming that a group exists only when someone or something is representing 
the group. This should not be interpreted as saying that a group only exists when somebody is 
actively going out to represent the group or officially making a symbol to represent the group. We 
should rather understand representation as I have already described it, as the symbol that one person 
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thinks about when thinking about the group. In this way, when one person is thinking about some 
people as belonging to a group, they are already represented as a group, but for this representation 
to gain importance, the symbol have to be used and understood by more people. 
 Singh (1999) is identifying an effective way of constructing someone to belong to a group 
when he describes the representation of minorities that are common in Western media. If the media 
are commenting on someone belonging to an ethnic minority they are often mentioning their 
ethnicity, but if the person is belonging to an ethnic majority, it is not mentioned. Every time this 
happens ethnic minorities are consolidated into groups based on their ethnicity, while ethnic 
majorities are not grouped in this way. This might easily develop into what Singh describes as 
"negative labelling". For example, if every time a person belonging to an ethnic minority is 
committing a crime, his or her ethnicity is mentioned, that ethnicity might easily be associated with 
crime. In that way all the other aspects of this ethnicity is forgotten. However, when a person 
belonging to the majority is committing a crime, the crime will not be associated with the ethnic 
groups, simply because ethnicity in this case would not be mentioned. 
 Another form of labelling groups of people, in an often negative way, is through stereotypes. 
Hall (1997) is describing how representations of people, or groups of people, are often drawing on 
some characteristics that people that belong to a specific group is supposed to inhibit, and hiding the 
fact that those people also inhibit other characteristics. These stereotypes promote a very simplified 
picture of people, and can often be misleading. Hall is describing how these stereotypes where 
actively used by white Americans both in the period of slavery and during the upheavals following 
the civil rights movements in the 60-ties. According to him white people had placed all black people 
into a few stereotypes, and in that way they reduced the whole black culture to fit into those 
stereotypes. At the time when this was happening white people where the dominating group in their 
relations to black people and that is what made it possible for them to reduce black people in this 
way.  
 Said (1985) is looking at how dominance has affected science in the case of Orientalism. 
Orientalism used to be a popular branch of the social sciences for a long time, and it was collecting 
knowledge about the Orient. Said argues that this knowledge was heavily affected by the power 
relations at the time, where the western scholars were in a dominant position towards the subjects of 
their research, and that the research contributed to enhancing this domination. Hall (1997) is 
demonstrating how representations are constructed in a context where power relations play an 
important role, and Said is discussing the role of science in constructing these representations. This 
is a very important perspective to remember in all projects within the social sciences, because the 
project will always be a part of the construction of certain representations, and we have to be 
conscious about how these representations affect reality. This is especially important when people 
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are the focus of your study, because your findings can potentially have an impact on these people's 
lives in the future. 
 Loftsdottir (2008) is discussing a case where representations were consciously used for a 
political purpose. She has studied articles published in the Icelandic magazine "Skirnir" in the 18
th
 
century, and she found that most of the articles about Africa were describing Africans as primitive 
and peripheral. She argues that this was consciously done in order to compare them with Icelanders, 
thus showing the world that Iceland belonged within the European fellowship of developed 
countries even though it was a colony at that time. For this very same reason it created a lot of stir 
among Icelandic students in Denmark when a Danish museum wanted to exhibit Icelandic cultural 
items next to cultural items from African colonies. 
 Representations are necessary for us to be able to interpret the world, and to be able to think 
about it and speak about it, yet they are not neutral reflections of the world. Using different 
representations can alter the way we think about things and people, and thus alter our actions. 
Which representations that gain acceptance and validity is to some degree determined by the power 
relations between the proponents of different representations, and as such a dominant group may 
have the power to enforce representations that are beneficial to themselves upon subordinated 
groups. A common way of studying representations is through discourse analysis. 
Discourses and discourse analysis 
Jørgensen & Phillips (p. 9, my translation) is describing a discourse as: "….a specific way of 
speaking about and understanding the world, or a part of it." With other words, a discourse is a 
specific system of representations. Discourse analysis is about analyzing how these discourses are 
developing, and the social consequences that follow from them. The starting point is that 
discourses, as systems of representations, are used to interpret reality. They are defining the borders 
between true and false, and they are making some actions and reactions seem viable, while others 
become irrelevant, or even unthinkable (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999).  
 Within a discourse there can be several possible subject positions and master signifiers. A 
subject position is a position an individual can have within a discourse that affects how the 
individual can act. Examples of subject positions within a discourse on visiting can, be the position 
of the guest or host. The discourse on visiting carries some expectations to both the host and the 
guest. A good host is supposed to make his guest feel comfortable, while the guest should never 
complain at the host, at least not while still being a guest. In this way the discourse places some 
actors in specific positions that limit what they can or cannot do and say. A master signifier is a 
subject position that is especially important through several discourses, but that takes on a specific 
meaning within each discourse. For example "man" and "woman" are two master signifiers that any 
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person has to relate to, but what it implies to be a man or a woman is determined within specific 
discourses. A discourse can construct a man as someone strong, active and providing for his family, 
and for someone to be accepted as a real man within that discourse, he has to inhibit those 
characteristics, while another discourse might construct "man" totally different. What is important is 
that everybody that falls into the category of being a man, has to relate to the construction of the 
man within the prevalent discourses of his environment (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). 
 Another important concept within discourse analysis is metaphors. Metaphors are a way of 
comparing two signifiers, in order to transfer the meaning of one signifier to the other. This can 
have the effect of highlighting some of the characteristics of a signifier and hiding others (Jørgensen 
& Phillips 1999). An example of a very effective use of a specific metaphor happened this summer 
in Norway, when the national authorities wanted to build a new line for transmission of electric 
power through the Hardangerfjord. This area is famous for its beautiful scenery and it is popular 
destination for tourists. The use of the word “monster mast” to describe parts of the lines 
highlighted specific qualities about the project. The masts were seen as huge and ugly and 
destroying for the local environment and communities, and at the time I was writing this thesis the 
national authorities had been forced to take back its decision and revise the issue again. 
 
In addition to separate discourses, discourse analysis is operating with discourse orders, which are 
the order of all the different discourses that are in use in a specific situation (Jørgensen & Phillips).  
Much used examples of discourse orders are those existing within institutions, like for example 
hospitals, but discourse orders can also be interpreted to be the order of discourses within any 
constructed case, like for example a scientific case which is defined by the researcher for a specific 
purpose. The discourses within a discourse order are often contradicting each other, because they 
are competing ways of interpreting the reality of the situation. They can be contradicting because 
they have different starting points, and are interpreting reality from different perspectives, or 
because they are used by different interests. Discourse orders are important analytical tools, because 
they make it possible to understand the complexity of the discourses that are always in play in any 
given situation. 
  Laclau and Mouffe were working with post-structuralist discourse theory to analyze 
changes in the discourse orders. Where structuralist cannot analyze change, this is possible for post-
structuralists. This is because structuralists are concerned only with langue, while post-structuralists 
also analyze parole. Laclau and Mouffe used the term articulation to analyze the use of different 
discourses within a discourse order. This term implies that several elements are combined through 
active use of language. This makes it possible to analyze change, because we can analyze the way 
in which the elements are combined. We can check if there are any new, uncommon combinations, 
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and we can check if elements are combined within a discourse, across several discourses within the 
same discourse order, or even across several discourse orders. When elements are combined from 
several discourses or discourse orders, this is likely to create change, because new elements are 
brought together(Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). As an example of how this works, people from an 
NGO are likely to use elements from discourses that are much used within that NGO. Yet they also 
have the possibility to use elements from discourses that are common in other spheres, like for 
example private business. If using elements from outside the usual discourse order becomes 
common the discourse order will be changed. 
 At any given time, a discourse can achieve a hegemonic status. When a discourse becomes 
hegemonic, it is seen as a true and objective description of the world, and any descriptions that are 
in conflict with the hegemonic discourse are seen as false or even impossible. However hegemony 
is never complete and can only survive for a limited period of time. By combining elements in new 
ways discourses are changed and so hegemony can be broken. This can happen as a result of 
changing times without, but it can also happen as a result of a conscious process of deconstruction. 
Because discourses are socially constructed, they can also be deconstructed to reveal other 
possibilities, and when other possibilities are revealed it becomes possible to work politically in 
order to change the status of the discourses and break the hegemony (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999).  
 
Power is the ability to change the statuses of specific discourses, either to make some discourses 
hegemonic or to make others unthinkable. It can be constructive, because it creates order. If there 
were no such thing as power, it would be impossible to decide which discourse to believe in. There 
would be no discourse-orders, but rather discursive chaos which would make it impossible for 
people to understand each other and cooperate. By making some discourses more likely power 
draws people in the same direction so as to facilitate cooperation. But power can also be negative 
through oppression of alternative ways of thinking. Positive and negative power always come 
together, because the production of order can never happen within the oppression of some 
alternatives (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999).  
 When the power relationship between two groups is very uneven, it becomes possible for 
one group to dominate over the other, and to impose its own will and its own discourses. By using 
their power the dominant group can punish subordinates for opposing them or acting outside of the 
discourse, and they can reward them for cooperating, but they are only able to do so effectively as 
long as they know what the subordinates are doing. This is the background for what Scott (1990) 
terms public and hidden transcripts. 
 The public transcript is what is said by both the dominating group and the subordinates 
when they are in contact with each other. Because the subordinates always face the prospect of 
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being punished or rewarded by the dominating group, they will always try to please them. In other 
words they will do what they believe the dominating group want them to do as long as any 
members of the dominating group are present. These actions will almost always confirm the 
existing discourses and power relationships. In the same way the dominants will guard their actions 
when they are observed by the subordinates, so that they always act in order with the discourse that 
gives them their power. For example, if the power of the dominants derives from their strength, they 
have to be very careful not to show any weakness towards the subordinates (Scott 1990). 
 The hidden transcript consists of what is said and done when no members from the opposite 
group will be able to know about it. When no members of the dominant group are present, the 
subordinates do not have to conform to their discourses. They can create their own discourses that 
can be directly contradicting the discourses of the dominating group, as long as the dominating 
group will not know about it. In the same way the members of the dominating group can relax 
without having to worry about acting in order with the discourse, as long as no members of the 
subordinate group are present. In order for hidden transcripts to develop and evolve, the groups 
have to have some secure social spaces where they can speak and act without being observed by the 
other group (Scott 1990). 
 The public transcript can be slightly more conforming to the hegemonic discourse than the 
hidden transcript, or the hidden transcript can be totally different from and in direct conflict with the 
public transcript, or it can be somewhere in between. The more uneven the power-relations are, the 
more likely it is that the public transcript and the hidden transcript will be totally different. 
According to Scott (1990), the border between the hidden and public transcript will always be 
contested no matter if the difference in power is big or small. The dominating group will try to 
make the public transcript as confirming of their power as possible, while the subordinates will try 
to gain more freedom to express their own views. 
 For a researcher, it is important to remember that the public transcript is not the whole story. 
It is a bad guide to the opinions of the subordinates, because they will only say what they believe 
the dominating group wants to hear (Scott 1990). Yet it might be difficult to gain access to the 
hidden transcript, because it requires a lot of trust on the behalf of the researcher. If a relationship of 
trust with the subordinates cannot be established, or can only be partially established, it can be very 
difficult to access the opinions of the subordinates, but one way would be to look for contradictions 
within the statements from the same interviewee. When someone is contradicting herself, she might 
be drawing on a mix of the public and hidden transcripts, and as such the contradictions might be a 
hint that the public transcript is significantly different from the hidden one.  
 
The hidden and public transcripts represents different discourses. They are systems of 
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representations that facilitate some interpretations and make other interpretations unlikely or 
impossible. By analyzing discourses, we can deconstruct them and be able to see alternatives that 
were previously hidden. Analyzing the use of discourses can also be useful in order to interpret 
existing power relationships within a case, and when doing a case analysis, it is important to 
remember that what is said and done in the open is not necessarily representative for the whole case, 
because power-relations can make people disguise their real opinions. 
Nationalism 
The national discourse is a specific way of giving meaning to the world, through dividing it in 
cultural or territorial "islands". Today nations exist as collections of institutions and practices, 
emotional gathering points and important discursive concepts. They can be interpreted as imagined 
communities that make people feel that they have something in common, or some knowledge of 
each other, even though the communities are too large to make any personal contact possible. The 
national groups are constituted through representations of the national and the use of symbols such 
as flags, national anthems, national cuisines, folkloric culture and so on. There are two different 
ways of thinking around the basis for the national community, and they are often used 
simultaneously (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). 
 The first way to think about the nation is like a cultural unit, where every member has 
something in common based on their culture. They share the same history, language and culture 
across the whole nation and because of this, someone from another nation cannot become a member 
of a new nation, just by moving to its territory. The newcomer would not share the history, language 
and culture that constitutes the nation, thus he should not be considered a member. This way of 
thinking about what a nation is presumes that language, culture and history are homogenous units 
that exist across the whole of the nation (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). 
 The second way of thinking about nation, however, sees it as a territorial unit, where the 
nation is closely bound to the territories where it exist, and the what holds the members of the 
community together is their bounds to the land. In this version someone can become a member of 
the nation through proving their bounds to the land, even though this is usually a long process 
(Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). 
 The nation, as all other groups, consists of its members, but to define who is belonging to a 
nation is not as easy. If you think about the nation as a cultural unit, then the membership to the 
nation is inherited from parents to children, together with the culture, history and language of that 
nation. This is sometimes referred to as Jus Sanguinis. If you see the nation as a territorial unit 
however, then membership to the nation is granted upon the bounds of the individual to the land, 
usually in terms of residence. This is referred to as Jus Soli (David 2000).  
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 As mentioned the two perspectives on the nation is often mixed together. They are two 
different discourses, that both belong to the discourse order of the nation, and they are both used, 
and often mixed, when there is talk about the nation. This also implies that membership to the 
nation is granted both through inheritance and through belonging to the territory. Defining who 
belongs to the nation is an ongoing social process that is always changed by the contests in the 
discourse order, and so one person cannot decide whether to be a member of a nation or not, even 
though she can do some efforts to be represent herself as a member or non-member (Jørgensen & 
Phillips 1999). 
 As a discursive concept, nationality has some characteristics, as described above, but in 
addition to what defines nationality as such, each nation is defined by the way it is different from 
other nations. For example Norwegians are considered, by themselves, as different from the Danish 
because they are good at skiing, while the Danish are not. Because of the way a nation is defined by 
being different from another nation, feelings of being strange and different might easily be 
interpreted in a nationalist discourse as arising from differences in cultures between different 
nations. Jørgensen & Phillips (1999) gives an example of a British woman on a trip to Denmark that 
noticed that many of the Danish people she visited had their showers in the kitchen. Because she 
had not seen this before, she interpreted it as something specifically Danish. She did this because 
the nationalist discourse is often used to explain differences, so it came to her mind when she 
experienced something different, but her experiences could just as well be described as a class 
phenomenon, or just a coincident. 
 Three metaphors are commonly used to speak about nationality. The first is of the nation as 
an extended family. This is among other things expressed through the way we talk about earlier 
members of the nation as our forefathers, and the language of our own nation as our mother tongue. 
Through this metaphor, the national is constructed as something that is always continuing through 
the new children of the kin. It also emphasizes that nation, just as family, is something one is born 
into, not something for the individual to choose whether or not to be a member of. The second 
metaphor is the metaphor of the nation as a tree. In the same way as trees belong in specific places, 
so it is implied that members of a nation belongs in the nation, and if they leave the nation, they will 
be affected by a lack of roots. Within this metaphor, migration becomes deeply problematic and 
complicated. Just as moving a tree comes with a great risk of damage to the tree, moving out of the 
national home comes with great risks of danger to the migrant. When they are moving, they are in 
danger of losing their roots and they will have problems settling down in their new place. This 
metaphor is often used to explain problems of integrating migrants from vastly different cultures 
than our own, and can often conceal other problems, such as discrimination and marginalization that 
keeps the migrants from integrating. The third metaphor is the one of the nation as an individual, 
23 
 
which we use when we speak about the birth of a nation, or its age. An individual is easy to 
conceive of, it has clear borders and it is one homogenous unit without inner differences. Through 
this metaphor it becomes possible to hide differences within the nation, and give validity to a 
statement through the use of phrases such as “The nation wishes…”, or “The nation has decided…” 
(Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). 
 The national discourse can never fit the world perfectly. There will always be people that do 
not feel like they belong to any nation or fail to be recognized as members of a nation, as well as 
people that feel a sense of belonging to several nations. However this is not an issue in the national 
discourse. As most other discourses it includes the things that fit in, and excludes all issues that do 
not fit. This is in the nature of discourses, because discourses operate with certain concepts, and 
then the world is described in such a way that it fits the discourse. But a discourse will never be the 
only one on the field, and when one discourse is found incapable of explaining a phenomenon, 
another discourse will be used. In this way discourses develop to fit an ever changing world. Thus, 
the national discourse is only one of many discourses that can be used to describe and interpret the 
world of nation-states.  Historically it has only existed for a few centuries, and most likely it will 
cease to exist in the near or distant future. 
The history of the nation: 
During the last few centuries, the national discourse has evolved into becoming a hegemonic 
discourse. It has been naturalized as an objective truth, and as a consequence, the national division 
of the world is seen as something natural, and unchangeable (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). 
 The term nation is old, but its use has not always been similar to how it is used today. 
According to Calhoun (1997, p. 9): 
“The term “nation” is old, but before the modern era, it meant only people linked by place 
of birth and culture. It signalled nothing about the relationship of such identity to larger or 
smaller groupings, neither did it carry clear political connotations.” 
 
In this context it makes sense to discuss the history of the nation, and different theories about how 
the nation came into being. 
 According to primordial theories, nations have always existed. All individuals have a set of 
elemental affiliations, with deep historical roots. This perspective is academically outdated, but it is 
still an important part of the national discourses outside of the universities. According to these 
theories, a group of people, or a nation, can be understood on the basis of common characteristics. 
These nations are developing over time, but they have always existed in one form or another 
(Stokke 1999).  
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 According to Kellas (1998) the opposite of primordialism is contextualism where nations are 
seen as products of particular economic and social circumstances. He (p.45) claims that: “...we can 
look for an explanation for the rise of nationalism in the developments which have taken place in 
politics, in the economy and in culture.”  
 
 But there are many different theories as to how the modern nations have developed. One 
theorist that is very close to primordialism is Anthony Smith. He claims that nations have developed 
from what he calls ethnie. These ethnie are primordial groups of people which shares a loyalty to 
the groups based on their ethnicity. For Smith (in Kellas 1998 p. 60)  
"modern nations simply extend, deepen and streamline the ways in which members of 
ethnie associated and communicated. They do not introduce startlingly novel elements, or 
change the goals of human association and communication." 
 However for the ethnie to develop into nations, modernism was a necessity. It was the 
decline of religion, the rise of the state and industrial economy that made it possible to mobilize and 
politicize the ethnie into the nation. But for Smith the essence of the nations is the same as the 
essence of the ethnie, and therefore tradition and pre-modern culture, national myths and old 
languages are the real substance of nationalism (Kellas 1998). 
 Ernst Geller does not agree with this. He is focusing on the primacy of material conditions in 
shaping political thought and social change, and he claims that nations are communities that were 
constructed in order to aid the transition into industrial societies. These societies require particular 
forms of polity and culture for economic growth to occur. A homogeneous society with an 
educational system for all is necessary to train workers and managers for the industry, and provide 
all with a common high culture. A common language is necessary to facilitate for mobility and 
division of labour. Nationalism achieved its success because it was appropriate for the needs of the 
time. However Gellner does not explain the emotional appeal of the nation (Kellas 1998). 
 A theorist that is focusing on the emotional appeal of the nation is Benedict Anderson. He 
sees nations as imagined communities, that are facilitated by commercial printing on a wide spread 
scale, which Anderson calls printing-capitalism. This has two main functions. Printing made it 
possible to distribute books to big masses of people, and in this way it made it commercially viable 
to translate books into several languages. When languages went from oral to written, they were 
standardized within the boundaries of the nation, creating common languages with clear boundaries. 
The second function of printing also has to do with the distribution of books to more people. When 
the books were distributed, so were the stories in the books, and this made it possible to spread the 
story of the nation. However Anderson also holds up some other factors that where necessary for 
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nationalism to emerge, such as the exploration of the world, and the exchange of the divine rights of 
the king for rule by the people (Kellas 1998). 
 
The different theories of the history of the nation illustrate that nation is a contested concept. The 
term can be interpreted differently within different discourses, for example as a way of organizing 
institutions or as imagined communities in which we feel connected to each other because of the 
emotional appeal of the national. Within the nationalist discourse the nation is interpreted closer to 
the primordial understanding that is presented here. Nations are understood as naturally given units 
that should be decisive in choosing how to organize the society. This understanding of the nation 
implies a connection between the nation and the state, where the state is a national institution set to 
govern the national territories. 
Nation and state 
According to Jørgensen & Phillips (1999), the nation-state is seen as a limited territory that is 
inhabited by a linguistically and culturally homogenous people, with the right to supremacy over 
their own territory. The national idea is an interpretation of the world as naturally divided in nation-
states. All land, except for the poles, are, and should be, the territory of a nation-state, and it can 
only belong to one such at a time. 
 The discourse about the nation-state plays a vitally important role in today's society. Since it 
began to take shape in the 18
th
 century, the discourse have been more and more hegemonic, and as a 
result, today's world is mainly arranged in nation-states, or attempts as such, and the most important 
international institutions are those based on nation-states.  
 Because of the hegemonic status of the nation-state in the national discourse order, the two 
concepts of nation and state are often mixed together, and used interchangeably. However I will 
argue that there is a difference between the two, and that they should be kept separately. A state is a 
set of institutions used to govern a limited territory, whereas a nation is a much vaguer concept, as 
discussed above. In the nation-state, the territory that is governed by the state should ideally be 
exactly the same territory that is inhibited by the nation, and the culture of the nations, and the 
institutions of the state become so overlapping that they are difficult to keep apart. However, not all 
states in the world are nation-states, and not all nations have their own states. Secondly, because of 
increased amount of voluntary and forced migration more and more people often belong to a 
different nation than the prevailing nation in the state in which they are living. 
Citizenship and nationality: 
Citizenship can be compared to membership, in that it gives rights and duties to the holder. This 
includes right to private ownership, right to basic social services, and duties such as paying taxes 
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and following laws. Butenschon (2000) is separating between three forms of citizenship. Civil 
citizenship means that you are accepted as a part of the community, you have to pay taxes, and are 
guaranteed legal justice. Political citizenship implies a right to have a hand in political decisions, for 
example through democratic elections. Social citizenship gives the right to social security and 
welfare services.  
 Since the French revolution, political citizenship has been an important part of the 
citizenship concept. Before the revolution, the power to rule the country, according to the 
hegemonic discourse, was granted the king directly from God, and opposing the king was 
synonymous with opposing God. But the revolution questioned this, and said that the power to rule 
the country should be given by the inhabitants of the country, through elections where all citizens 
should be able to participate. In the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century, citizenship was reserved for a small elite, 
but throughout the centuries, it has been broadened to include new groups, and modern citizenship 
is supposed to include all the inhabitants of the state (Faulks 2000). 
 Just as the concept of membership implies that the holder is a member of the national group, 
the concept of citizenship has a similar relation to the state. Just as the two terms nation and state 
are often used interchangeable, citizenship is often used interchangeable with nationality, referring 
both to the state and the nation. However, as I argued that there is a need to distinguish between 
nation and state, it follows that it is necessary to distinguish between membership to the state and 
membership to the nation. I shall therefore use the term nationality to refer to membership of the 
nation, and citizenship to refer to membership of the state. 
Home-land, host-country, nationality and belonging: 
An important part of the nationality-discourse is the idea that people have a homeland where they 
have a natural belonging. For most people the homeland is the land where they were born and grew 
up, and often they are living in the same country all their lives. Thus homeland and the country 
where they are living is the same. However this is not the case for all. Migration has always existed, 
and migration over big distances is becoming more and more common with increased travelling 
opportunities. Many people move to another country for a limited period of time, and have 
continued strong feeling of their country of birth as their homeland. But in the nationalist discourse, 
the country of birth remains the homeland, even though the individual has no plans of returning, or 
begins to feel more at home in the country of residence. Even when migrants have children, the 
parent’s country of birth is often referred to as the homeland of the children. These children 
sometimes grow up without ever visiting their “home-land”, and most of them develop a strong 
sense of belonging in the country where they live. Yet according to the nationalist discourse they 
belong in the “home-land”, and cannot be fully accepted residents of the countries where they live 
27 
 
without attaining the nationality. 
 Another important part of the nationalist discourse is the concept of host-country. When 
migrants first arrive in a new country, they are often referred to as guests, and the country they 
arrive in as their host-country. This makes the stay seem temporary, the immigrants become visitors 
that are only in the host-country for a short visit. However when immigrants move to a new country 
to stay there permanently, this idea of a home and host-country might have big implications on their 
lives in their new country.  
 When this happens, the immigrants are made permanent visitors, and often end up in what 
Chan (2005) describes as liminality. They are caught in between the fact that they are unable or 
unwilling to return to their home-country, and that they are not accepted as belonging in their new 
country. According to Chan (2005, p. 347-348): 
“They are subjected to the immigration policy, the population categories, and various 
related policies imposed by the host state and its institutions. With respect to the 
homeland, migrants are at the so-called periphery, consuming media products that 
originate from the homeland or so-called centre which tend to focus on the identities and 
practices of those who have not left home.”  
At the same time they are not fully accepted in the host-country, and they realize that they are 
different from the people that stayed behind in their homeland. They are living in the past in the 
homeland, and suffer incomplete integration into the host society. Depending on the immigrants and 
the host-country, this can go on for several generations.  
 When people are caught in this kind of liminality imagining the homeland become important 
in the construction of their national identity. “Their collective identity is defined by their 
relationship to, and continual support for, the homeland” (Chan 2005, s.337). They maintain myths 
and memories about their homeland because they realize that they cannot be fully accepted by the 
host-country, and because they often long to return to the homeland. They show solidarity with each 
other based on their place of origin and their marginal places in the host societies. 
Diaspora 
Diaspora is a term that is often used about mass-settlements of people outside of their home-land. It 
refers to people from one specific place being scattered around many different places, as a result of 
voluntary or forced mass-movements. Diaspora is a much used, but slightly diffuse term. It carries a 
strong historical reference to the Jewish diaspora, yet it has been used to describe many other exile 
populations. According to Peteet (2007), the term is in danger of becoming semantically 
overloaded, and she is discussing some key characteristics that should be present in an exile 
population in order to term it a diaspora. In this context, it is not as important to define what a 
diaspora is, but rather how the term can be used to better our understanding of identity formation in 
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exile. The concept of home-land is important to many exile communities, and these might uphold 
connections to the homeland and other communities within the same diaspora, through an elite, and 
communal institutions. These institutions are important for identity formation, because they have 
power over the discourse about the community and the home-land. The dream of return and the 
communal memory of the homeland are usually important, and the institutions sit on important 
information, especially with regard to the collective memory. Being a part of a diaspora community 
can become very important for persons that are unable to be fully accepted as a part of the host-
country, because it give them a place to show solidarity with each other. As a result it can often 
become important to conform to the discourse of the institutions in order to be accepted, and the 
institutions can be very powerful in regard to identity formation, even down to the individual level. 
 
Home-land and host-country are important concepts in the diaspora, and they are important for the 
relations of diasporic populations to the land where they are living and the lands they have left. 
Because of the emphasis on the home-country, it can be difficult to settle in a new country. In this 
way nationality becomes very important in determining where a person belongs. In the analysis I 
am referring to a discourse of "belonging as nationality" as a collection of discursive practices that 
constructs belonging as equal to nationality. Within this discourse a person should ideally live in the 
country where she has her national roots. In other words a persons home-land is determined by her 
nationality, and that is where she belongs. Within this discourse, if a person resides outside her 
home-land, the country she lives in is constructed as her host-country. She can never be at home 
there or belong there, but she is allowed to stay there as a guest. 
 If this understanding of belonging to the nation is combined with a mixing of nationality and 
citizenship, the consequences for migrants are even bigger. If a migrants national homeland is seen 
as something fixed from birth, depending on the nationality the person was born into, then the 
nationality cannot be changed. In this way nationality becomes something that is fixed on a person 
for every. And if citizenship is consequently mixed up with nationality, then it becomes impossible 
to changes one's citizenship. When this understanding prevails, a person can be living in a country 
for decades without being able to obtain the citizenship, and if a couple consisting of two such 
persons have children, their children will no be able to obtain the citizenship either. 
 In this way, discourses can have tremendous impacts upon people's lives, and the discourse 
of "belonging as nationality" can effectively block people not only from complete integration in a 
country, but from every opportunity to obtain citizenship. In my thesis I will explore the case of a 
Palestinians community in Cairo, trying to manage their lives in the liminality between Egypt and 
Palestine. The community has its own institution connected to their homeland, and the one thing 
that binds them together is that they all identify themselves as Palestinians and their nationality play 
29 
 
an important part in their lives. Many of those people are unable to obtain Egyptian citizenship even 
though their families have been living in Egypt for several generations. Their experiences of living 
in liminality between Palestine and Egypt are important for the community, and I will analyze how 
they are using the discourse of "belonging as nationality" to  interpret these experiences 
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Chapter 3: 
Methods 
The use of research method is very important for the quality of any research. Choosing appropriate 
methods can be decisive for the outcome of the research. Describing the choices done in regards to 
methods is important in order to enable the readers to judge the quality of the research as well as the 
basis for the interpretations that are presented in the analysis. In this chapter I will discuss my own 
choices with a heavy emphasis on the experiences from the work with the thesis. 
 The chapter starts with some remarks on research design. I had decided right from the 
beginning to use qualitative methods with a focus on representations and discourses, but the rest of 
the research design was made along the way. In the following, I am careful to describe the final 
research design, as well as the process that lead to it.  This part includes all the considerations I did 
during the fieldwork, as I consider those an integral part of my research design. The choice of 
interviewees as well as interview questions, overcoming language problems and being present in the 
community all had a decisive impact on the data material  gathered. 
 The second part of the chapter is about the analysis. This part describes all the steps I took 
while working on the analysis, and considerations around the presentation. The chapter ends with a 
few notes on the transferability and credibility of the findings. 
Research design 
According to Thagaard (2009), qualitative approaches make it possible to gain an understanding of 
social phenomena, on the basis of in-depth data about the people and situations that are studied. It 
also makes it possible to interpret processes and meaning that cannot be measured quantitatively. 
When I chose my methods both of those factors were important, as my study is both about social 
phenomena and immeasurable sizes.  
 Representations are phenomena that are difficult to measure quantitatively. In quantitative 
studies, the researcher has to make up her own categories before entering the field, and this makes it 
difficult to be able to study much more than those categories. Qualitative methods, however, retain 
the necessary openness and flexibility to be able to go behind the researchers categories and give 
the interviewees opportunities to present their own representations. The issue of my study is also 
one of which most of the interviewees had strong personal opinions, and it was very important for 
me to give the interviewees room to express these opinions freely. 
The issues in focus for my thesis has been very important for my research design. From the 
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start of the work with my thesis, I knew that I wanted a discursive perspective on my work. The 
winter of 2008-09 I decided that I wanted to work with Palestine. At this time the ongoing Gaza-war 
caught the worlds attention. There were big demonstrations all over the world, including Oslo, and 
the scale of the demonstrations in Oslo, together with the reports on the cruelty of the war made a 
big impression on me. At first I wanted to do some research about the demonstrations in Norway, 
but after some more thinking I decided on another focus. When I started reading more about Israel, 
I found out that the concept of nationality plays a very important role in the conflict. I read about 
how the Israeli law is differentiating between people of different nationalities even among people 
with Israeli citizenship, and I read about the different types of identity documents that were given to 
Palestinians inside and outside Palestine. This made me interested in the construction of national 
identity and citizenship in the Palestinian case, both how the Israeli law used these terms and how 
the Palestinians used them themselves. I started checking out the possibilities for doing fieldwork in 
the West Bank, but I soon realized that that would be impractical, and at the same time I started 
running out of time. I have previously been studying in Egypt, and thus I knew that I would be 
comfortable living in Cairo, something that would make it easier to focus on my research during the 
fieldwork. I started reading more about Palestinians in Egypt, and what makes them different from 
Palestinians in other countries. In Egypt the Palestinians do not live in refugee camps, like in 
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. They live dispersed among Egyptians, and live their lives very much 
like Egyptian, yet they are constituted as a separate group from Egyptians. When I learned that 
many Palestinians families have lived in Egypt for several generations without receiving Egyptian 
citizenship, I decided that I wanted to learn more about what it was that made this group 
Palestinian. Why could they not get Egyptian citizenship, and how is this affecting their lives? 
 A few weeks after this, I was on my way to Egypt. I was going to stay there for two months, 
and in that time I was going to conduct my fieldwork.. At this time I did not have a research 
question or a complete research design, but I had already done some studies on representations, 
discourses, nationality and citizenship. Based on this I build a theoretical framework for my studies, 
and thus I knew what I wanted to learn from my fieldwork. 
 I wanted to know what nationality meant to Palestinians in Egypt, how it affected their lives, 
and how they used the term themselves. And I wanted to know what I meant to them not to have 
Egyptian citizenship. The important thing was not to have knowledge of as many Palestinians as 
possible, but rather to have detailed knowledge about the experiences of a few of them. This 
detailed knowledge could tell me much more about how they experienced their own situation and 
how they related to the discourses that were used to interpret it. Because of this I decided to do in-
depth, semi-structured interviews with a small group of Palestinians living in Cairo. 
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Qualitative studies are appropriate for studying issues where there are few prior studies, because 
such studies require openness and flexibility. They can range from studies which begin with precise 
research questions, to studies that begin with a very vague theme and develops as the researcher 
gains more data (Thagaard 2009). 
 Not many studies having been carried through on Palestinians in Egypt, and most of them 
are relatively old. Of the newer works ElAbed's (2009) study of the livelihood of Palestinians in 
Egypt is the most important. I have used this study a lot in my own work, yet it is a description of 
the Palestinian's livelihood, and not an interpretation of their experiences of nationality. The only 
work I could find on the nationality of Palestinians in Egypt was a thesis by Ismail (2007). Even 
though this thesis gave me important inspiration during my fieldwork, it had a totally different focus 
than my own. Because of the lack of prior knowledge on my theme, I had only very vague ideas 
about what I would find. For this reason it was difficult to make a complete research design with a 
clear research question before going into the field. Setting to strict boundaries for my research 
before conducting fieldwork would have made it much more difficult to be open to new findings. I 
was depending upon my first weeks in the field to give more direction to my fieldwork, because 
during that time I would be able to gain a better insight into some key issues. 
 Because of the lack of a clear research question and complete research design, I could not 
ask my questions directly related to the research question. I was more concerned with gaining as 
much general knowledge of the area as possible. Even though this left me with a lot of information 
that was not directly relevant, and maybe even got me less directly relevant information, it has 
proved to be an advantage for my studies. It allowed me to focus on what the interviewees were 
emphasizing, and be open to issues I might not have thought about myself. In addition, the 
questions I asked were heavily influenced by my relations to the interviewees. I adjusted my 
questions both to the interviewee's reactions and to the context where the interviews were 
conducted. I will continue by discussing the questions I asked during my interviewees, and the 
possibilities to ask other questions later in the analysis, but first I will make some remarks to the 
choice of methods for my study. 
 
Case study: 
A basic principle in social constructivism is that meaning only exists where it is socially 
constructed. The world's existence is not dependent on human interpretation, but in order to 
understand the world, in such a way that it becomes a meaningful surrounding for our own lives, we 
need to interpret it. This interpretation might be different from one place to another, and from one 
group of people to another. Jørgensen & Phillips (1999) states that science is not representing any 
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objective, everlasting truths. Reality is only available to us through our own interpretation of it, and 
this interpretation again is dependent on the context in which it is happening. A case can be a good 
context for studying the interpretations that are prevalent within that context.  
 A case, according to Thagaard (2009), is an empirically limited unit, where phenomena can 
be studied in their natural context within a study based on several sources. When I first arrived in 
Egypt, my case was simply the Palestinian community in Egypt. But it soon became evident that 
this was not a possible choice of a case, because the Palestinian community in Egypt is difficult to 
understand as one unit. There is a huge diversity within the community, and it has very diffuse 
limits, and because of this I would not have been able to get a sample of interviewees that could 
provide a good basis for my analysis, and I would not have known the limits of my case. I will 
discuss both of these claims further in chapter 4, but here it suffices to say that Palestinians in Egypt 
are difficult to find, because of their similarity with Egyptians, and it is even difficult to define who 
is a Palestinian and who is an Egyptian, because of the diffuse boundaries between the two. 
 In the beginning of my fieldwork I was introduced to the General Union for Palestinian 
Women (GUPWom) in Cairo. The union is running a choir called the Choral Abd ElShams which 
consists of young Palestinians that gather to sing Palestinian folk songs and learning about 
Palestine. This choir, together with a similar group called AlFalluja folkloric group made up the 
core of my case. In addition I interviewed a few from the GUPWom and other PLO-institutions in 
Cairo, because these people had a distinct impact on the case. Common for all my interviewees was 
that they were conscious of their Palestinian nationality. They all regarded it as important for them 
to maintain their Palestinian identity and they all had opinions about how this was affecting them. 
Because of this affection towards Palestine, they were also interested in the developments of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This was important for me, because it meant that they were interested in 
the issues that were in focus for my study. Thus they would be able to provide me with relevant 
information, they would experience my questions as relevant for their lives, and they were likely to 
take an interest in my study. This also made it possible for the interviewees to influence my studies 
more, thus making them even more relevant and interesting, opening my eyes to issues I would not 
be able to see on my own. 
 The sources I use in my study are mainly the data from my interviews, but I also use some 
secondary sources, primarily ElAbed’s (2009) study on the livelihood of Palestinians in Egypt. This 
study is concerned with all the Egyptian rules and institutions Palestinians in Egypt that are 
affecting the lives of Palestinians in Egypt, and so it helps me to understand the institutions and 
laws that are shaping the context around my case.  
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The interviews 
The interviews are in-depth interviews, and I have spoken with each interviewee for between 30 
minutes and 2 hours, depending on how much the interviewee had to say. I have used relatively 
unstructured interviews, in order to give my interviewees as much freedom as possible to bring up 
issues that were important to them. At the same time I had an interview guide with a set of standard 
questions which all my interviewees answered, either through their stories, or directly prompted by 
me. 
 When finding my interviewees I started out from General Union for Palestinian Women. I 
was introduced to the union by Amal who is in charge of recruiting new members to the union. She 
told me about the union, and invited me to attend a celebration where many of their members would 
be present. There I was introduced to more people, and made appointments for interviews with 
some of them. Later I was invited to another event where I was introduced to more interviewees. I 
also used the snowball method, asking my interviewees about other possible interviewees. This way 
my interviewees consisted of several groups, and I believe that they together gave me a good 
understanding of my case. 
 The first group consisted of 6 young people who where members of the Palestinian folkloric 
groups Choral Abbed ElShams and AlFalluja. Those where young people from very different 
backgrounds, but had their interest for Palestine and Palestinian traditions in common. They were 
all of Palestinian descent, and some of them had Egyptian citizenship, while others did not. These 
people were telling me about their own lives and experiences. 
 The second group consisted of 3 employees and volunteers in the General Union for 
Palestinian Women. These people devoted a lot of time to the union, and where key persons in the 
daily operations of the union. These people had a lot of experiences in common with the first group, 
and they were also telling me more about the union. 
 The third group consisted of other key persons within the PLO-institutions in Cairo. This 
group was including Mr. Yusuf ElNemnem, head of the General Union for Palestinian Workers in 
Cairo, Mai Arif, head of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society’s Cairo branch, Mohammad Salem, 
previous governor of Gaza City under the Fatah Authorities, now retired and living in Cairo, and 
two employees at the Palestinian embassy in Cairo. This group consisted of people that where 
representing the official views of these institutions, and their life experiences where vastly different 
from those in the first groups. 
 
During my first days in Cairo, I spent a lot of time working on my interview guide. It was important 
for me that the questions seemed sensible for my interviewees, and gave them opportunities to tell 
their stories, at the same time as they gave me the information I needed. This was difficult in the 
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beginning, because I tended to make the questions to directly related to my thesis, and thus difficult 
for my interviewees to understand. But after using some time phrasing and rephrasing the questions, 
my interviewees were able to answer them in a very satisfactory way. (For a review on the interview 
guide, see appendix 1.) 
 Another challenge was making the questions open so that my interviewees could be able to 
tell their stories, at the same time as they were helping them to start their answers. I solved this by 
making very open questions, and then preparing a set of follow up questions for those who was not 
able to answer the more general questions. Depending on the settings for the interviews, they 
ranged from relatively set interviews where I asked my questions and the interviewees answered, to 
interviews where the interviewees told their stories, and I asked follow up questions directly related 
to their stories, and then used the interview-guide as a checklist to make sure that I got the 
necessary information. I found the interviews that were closer to the last scenario more fulfilling, 
because they made the interview situation more relaxed and comfortable both for me and the 
interviewees, and because it made the interviewees talk more about things I had not thought about 
asking, thus opening my eyes for new perspectives. This tended to happen more and more towards 
the end of my fieldwork, and I believe there are two explanations to that. Firstly, I believe that I 
became a better interviewer towards the end of my fieldwork. I became more comfortable in the 
interview situation, and I got more used to asking questions. In the end, I did not rely so much on 
the interview guide anymore. Secondly the interviewees had seen me around, and knew more about 
my project, and had possibly also talked with other interviewees about the interviews before 
meeting me. Thus they became more comfortable in the situation, possibly starting to be more 
trusting of me and my intentions. 
 Another important aspect with having more conversational-like interviews, was that I were 
able to guide the interviewees into an issue, and at the same time react to their response, so that I 
did not push them to speak about things they were uncomfortable speaking about. This was very 
important in my interviews for two reasons. Firstly because some of the issues we were talking 
about reminded my interviewees of difficulties in their lives, and for some were difficult to speak 
about. Secondly, because Egypt is a country with heavy political censorship, were people can risk 
punishment by the government for having the wrong political opinions. Many people in the 
Palestinian community in Egypt have previously experienced problems with the government 
because of their opinions (ElAbed 2009), and there was a clear unwillingness among many towards 
speaking about the government or politically related issues. Pushing too much on, or going to 
directly into, sensitive issues could easily have made an awkward situation during the interview, as 
well as making my interviewees doubt my intentions. Using a conversational method made it 
possible to come close to these issues without going too far. 
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 Several other factors could also have affected the information I gained during my interviews. 
Among them, the researcher should always reflect on her own positionality, and the effect this has 
on the interview situation. This is affected by the researcher’s personal qualities, as well as 
characteristics such as sex, age and background. We can never know exactly how the information 
gained during the interview is affected by the interviewees’ relations to the researcher. The 
descriptions the interviewee is giving can also be affected by how she wants to present herself to the 
researcher (Thagaard 2009). In my thesis this perspective is very important, because what the 
interviewees chose to tell me reveal a lot about how they are constructing their identities, and who 
they want to be. Yet it is also reflecting the realities of their lives, because the interviewees were 
getting the stories they were telling me from their own life. As a researcher I have no reason to 
believe that the interviewees made up fake stories, but rather that they selected information based 
on how they understand their own lives. 
 During some of the interviews, other people from the community were present. In these 
cases I believe the interviewees did not speak as freely as they would have done if the other persons 
had not been there, and thus I might have missed some information. However this was difficult to 
avoid, and I judged it better to complete the interviews and get the information I could, than not 
doing the interviews at all. From the interview situation I cannot find any reason to believe that the 
information I got during the interviews were significantly altered because of the presence of other 
persons, except that some information might have been held back in order not to reveal conflicting 
opinions. 
 I was recording most of the interviews, and I always asked permission to record in front of 
the interview. I explained that this would allow me to focus more on the interview, and to remember 
their information more correctly. All of my interviewees were understanding of that, and none of 
them seemed to care very much about the recorder. 
 
Language issues were a challenge during the fieldwork. None of the interviewees had English as 
their mother tongue, and their English skills were very variable. I did not want English skills to be 
an issue when choosing my interviewees, because this would have made me unable to reach an 
important group of interviewees. 
 Due to earlier studies I knew some Arabic before I entered the field, yet this was not enough 
to do interviews in Arabic on my own. I did most of my interviewees in English, and a few in 
Arabic with the help of a translator. The interviewees undertaken in English was the least 
problematic, but during some of the interviews, I and my interviewee had problems understanding 
each other completely, and this restricted the flow of the interview, and made a natural, 
conversation-like interview difficult. These interviewees were more like structured question and 
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answer sessions, yet I gained lots of useful information from all the interviews, even though I could 
have learned even more if it were not for the language problems. 
 The interviews in Arabic were more challenging. It turned out to be difficult to find a 
translator that could be with me during all of the interviews, so I used a few different translators on 
different occasions. During two interviews a representative from the GUPWom had found a 
translator, during one interview I used my own translator, and during one interview I asked another 
interviewee to translate, because my translator cancelled in the last minute. 
 Several issues always arise when using a translator. One of them is that stopping to translate 
makes the interview slower, and makes it difficult to retain a natural flow in the interview. During 
the first two interviews, I made the interviews more structured. In this way I downplayed the 
importance of the flow. In these interviews I got an almost full and very accurate translation of 
everything during the interview. This made it easy for me to follow the interview, but it also made 
the interview very formal. In the two other interviews I relied more on my own ability to speak 
directly to the interviewee in Arabic and pick up some phrases from the answers. These interviews 
were much less structured, and more conversation-like, and I used the translator to help whenever I 
lost track of the conversation. This made it a bit more difficult to ask follow-up questions that were 
directly related to the interviewee’s stories, but it made the interviewees speak much more freely. 
Also the translators knew my studies quite well, and helped me asking relevant follow-up questions 
to keep the conversation going. In these interviews, the translator was taking a very active role in 
bringing the interview forward, and in one case the translator knew the interviewee well and added 
a little to the information he gave. This was affecting the information I got through the interview a 
lot, and must be taken into consideration during the analysis. However I believe this helped me gain 
more information, both by keeping the conversation going during the interview, and by making the 
cultural differences between me and my interviewees less apparent. 
 In all the four interviews in Arabic I used a recorder during the whole of the interviews. This 
made me able to listen to everything the interviewees was saying again, and to get an accurate 
translation of what was said, both by the interviewee and the translator. This proved very important 
to me during the analysis, because it made it possible for me to take into account the effect the 
translator is likely to have had on the interview. 
Observation and presence in the community: 
I was present on an event in the GUPWom, on practices in Choral Abbed ElShams and AlFalluja, 
and at another event together with many of the interviewees. In addition I spent some time with 
several of my interviewees outside of the interview-situation, and one of them invited me home to 
her family. This presence in the community is not a direct part of my analysis, but it did affect both 
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my relations to my interviewees and my understanding of the case, by giving me an insight into 
their situation which I could never have gained through the interviews alone. For example I was 
sitting in a street-cafe after an interview together with the interviewee and a few other people. When 
we sat there some people started to move the tables and chairs inside, and we had to move to 
another cafe. My interviewee told me that this happened because the police were there to strike 
down on street-cafes. Such cafes are very common in Cairo, and usually not perceived as illegal, 
but the police are regularly raiding them in order to confiscate the chair and tables. Those are later 
sold to give the police some extra income. This is just one example of the arbitrary law enforcement 
in Cairo, where the only purpose of the law is to give some benefits in specific situations. In this 
situation it was the police that could make some money on selling the chairs, in the museum the 
guards put up barriers in order that they could get "tips" from the visitors for letting them pass. This 
kind of enforcement of laws and regulations is very common in Egypt, and in some instances it is 
used politically by the government to hinder criticism. When the laws are of such a character that 
they are very commonly broken, it becomes easier for the government to punish people they do not 
like without to much attention. For example, it is very much easier to imprison someone for 
breaking a law than for being politically active, even though the law is ignored in other situations. 
Ethical considerations during fieldwork: 
Regarding the ethical considerations I had to do during my fieldwork, there are two issues I want to 
highlight. The first issue is the one of free and informed consent. According to Thagaard (2009), 
informed consent means that the interviewees should be informed about what participation in the 
project involves, and that they should be free to decide for themselves, without any pressure, 
whether to participate or not. They should also be free to cancel their participation at any time. 
Practically this is not as easy as it sounds. In my project I do not know how the people in the 
community interacted with each other when I was not present, so there is a possibility that some 
people in the community might have pressured other to participate. However I never had any 
suspicion of that, and I never encourage anyone to use any pressure toward making other people 
participate, neither did I use any such pressure myself. Therefore I feel right to assume that all my 
interviewees decided themselves whether to participate or not. When it comes to information, this is 
a bigger dilemma. Some of my interviewees asked me questions before we started the interview, 
and in those cases I took care to answer those questions as carefully as possible. One of my 
interviewees told me after the interview that usually when he meets someone for a project like 
mine, he would try to ask them some questions about the project, but this time he did not want to 
ask so many questions, because he wanted to speak freely and in his own language, not saying only 
what I wanted to hear. He captured an important point in this statement, and in this case I tried 
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telling him more about the project afterward. Regarding the rest of the interviewees, I explained 
who I was, and the basics of what I was doing before the interview. But I did not want to tell them 
too much about my projects, because that might have made them alter their contributions. 
 The second issue is the issue of confidentiality. When participating in interviews, the 
interviewees give you a lot of information that they are able to share with the researcher as an 
outsider, and the information they give will not have any consequences for them in their personal 
life later. Because of this, it is very important to make sure that the information gained from the 
interviews will remain between the interviewee and the researcher, and not get known by anyone 
else. This gives rise to some challenges in the presentation of the research that I will come back to, 
but it is also important how the researcher preserve the interview material to make sure it does not 
fall into the wrong hands. In the case of Egypt it is especially important that the information does 
not get into the wrong hands, because of the risk that the interviewees could face prosecution from 
the government. My interviewees were very aware of this, and most of them were careful not to 
voice any dangerous opinions, and I did not encourage them to do so either. Yet I was careful to 
keep the interview material safe. Another issue was being careful whenever I talked to someone in 
the community, not to talk about the interviews I had done with other people. 
Analysis: 
When I started working on the analysis I worked with each interview separately. In this way I 
obtained an understanding of which persons made which statements, and how the different 
statements were related to each other. But I soon turned my focus to a theme centred analysis, and 
this is also how the material is presented. Through theme centred analysis the information from all 
the interviewees can be gathered and compared within each theme. Through decontextualization, 
the information from the interviewees are taken out of its original context, and then 
recontextualized together with the theory (Thagaard 2009). This contributes to a deeper 
understanding of the issues in question, because comparing the views of the different interviewees 
brings out any present disagreement. It is also possible to explore if the interviewees are disagreeing 
according to specific lines. In my case, it was especially interesting to see the differences between 
the interviewees that were representing different organizations, and the interviewees that are only 
representing themselves, and there were also some differences in opinions that followed class lines. 
Those who come from families with a low income tend to emphasize certain problems, while those 
who have a higher income, and do no experience the problems themselves, tend to downplay their 
importance. 
 The biggest challenge when using theme centred analysis is the risk of alienating the 
interviewees. When using theme centred analysis, the information from the interviews is taken out 
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of its original context and put into the categories designed by the researcher. This might make the 
information come out different from how the interviewee intended it to be (Thagaard 2009). In my 
analysis, I have done my best to give a true representation of the opinions of the interviewees by my 
own comments on and analysis of the information. I have always tried to represent the interviewees 
in a way I believe they will find agreeable, but it is important to remember that even though the 
analysis is depending on the interview material, the arguments that are presented in the analysis are 
my own. The researcher is always writing her own story through the analysis, and in my case I have 
written the story so as to give as much as possible information about the issues I discuss, and to 
give as little as possible information about the separate interviewees. This is also done out of 
respect for the confidentiality of the interviewees. The interview situation should be such that the 
interviewee can trust the researcher, and be confident that what is said during the interviewee stays 
between the people present during the interview. When other people are present during the 
interview, this cannot always be guaranteed, but it is of vital importance that the information given 
during the interview is treated in such a way that it cannot be traced back to the interviewee from 
the presentation of the finished analysis. This is much easier to achieve through theme centred 
analysis, because the information is not gathered according to the interviewees (Thagaard 2009). 
Throughout the work with my thesis I have given the confidentiality of my interviewees very high 
priority. Because my research is partially critical of the Egyptian government, it is very important 
that no critical remarks can be traced back to the interviewees. Freedom of speech is not highly 
valued by the governing authorities in Egypt, and criticism of the government could in the worst 
case be punished with imprisonment. This is highly unlikely in my case, because it is a small 
project done in a country far away from Egypt, and because all of my interviewees were aware of 
the situation and careful with what they said, but the risk should be considered anyway. In addition, 
some of the information I obtained during the interviews was of such a character that it could be 
damaging for the interviewees if other people in the community found out about it. Therefore I have 
done my best to present the material in such a way that also people within the community shall not 
be able to know who said what. 
 For the same reasons that confidentiality is very important for my interviewees, many of 
them were very careful about giving their own opinions. However they often told me stories that 
said much more than their opinions could. For example interviewees could tell me stories of how 
they had troubles because of government regulations, but later say that they did not have any 
opinions about the government. In most cases, therefore, the stories my interviewees told me have 
been more important for the analysis than their direct opinions, simply because they were not 
willing to share their opinions except through their stories. 
 Discursive analysis very often takes the form of analysis of text, and that have been a 
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challenge for me in my analysis. In written text we can usually assume that the language is carefully 
though through, so that it becomes possible to analyse the use of different vocabulary or grammar. 
In a conversation these things are often more arbitrary, and therefore more difficult to analyse. In 
my case it made no sense to analyse the data-material as text because it had been translated. The 
discourses within my case were always constructed in Arabic and then translated, either by the 
interviewees during the interview, or by myself and my translator when transcribing the interview. 
During the translation I must assume that many of the finer details of the discourse have been 
changed, thus I would gain very little by studying the details of the translations. For example all my 
interviewees used the word nationality to describe both nationality and citizenship, but because I do 
not know how these terms relate to each other in Arabic, their use of the word cannot tell me much.  
Instead I have analyse the meaning of the words, as the intentions were made clear from the stories 
my interviewees told me, and from that I could understand that they made a clear differentiation 
between the concepts of nationality and citizenship, even though they used the same word to 
describe both. The important thing in the analysis is thus not the use of the word nationality, but 
rather the meaning of the concepts of citizenship and nationality that were communicated through 
the stories. 
Steps on the way to a complete analysis 
The analysis consisted of many small steps on the way to the whole. While conducting and 
transcribing the interviews, I gained knowledge of the information and its original context within 
the interviews. I also started to make my opinions on the issues that were going to be important for 
my analysis, and when I finished transcribing the interviewees, I was ready to start screening them 
for the important parts and rearranging the information thematically.  
 To be able to categorize the data material I first had to work out a research question. 
According to Thagaard (2009), the research question should give the researcher a clear guidance in 
terms of what the research should focus on. It should be limited enough to be studied within the 
limits of the research project, at the same time as it should be open enough to allow for changes in 
the research as a result of new findings. At the same time she states that the research question 
should be shaped and reshaped continuously throughout the research. The research question I 
worked out at this stage of the thesis has changed several times since, but it was still important in 
guiding my work in the right directions and leading the way to the final research question. 
 After I finished the first categorization, I started writing out some text. First the text was 
almost only consisting of data from my interviews, and only a few analytical notes. As I wrote the 
main job was to recontextualize the data, first only by categorizing the data from the interviews, and 
then by adding my own viewpoints. During this process the categories were changed several times, 
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on order to best allow for a good presentation of the findings.  
 As I worked with these preliminary texts it proved it difficult to give them a clear direction. 
To answer my research question, there were several issues that should be analysed separately. 
Therefore I made several sub-questions to guide the work with the separate parts of the analysis. 
These sub-questions were also refined through the work with my analysis, until I was left with the 
two sub-questions that I presented in my introduction. In my analysis, I answer each of these 
questions in a separate chapter, thus having a clear direction for both of the chapters. The first of my 
analysis chapters is not guided by a question, but rather functioning as an introduction to the two 
following chapters. 
 
The theory presented in the theory chapter was always there supporting my analysis. Together with 
the data material, the theory was shaping the analytical categories, and it was always in the back of 
my mind when working with the preliminary analysis. But it was first at the very end of my work 
with the analysis that I started using theory actively in the text. 
 The researcher’s interpretation of the data material will always be different from the 
interpretation of the interviewee. One important source of these differences is that the researcher’s 
interpretation is building on theory, while the interviewees’ interpretation is building only on their 
own experiences (Thagaard 2009). My own interpretation of the data has also been based on theory 
right from the start, but by keeping the theory in the background for a limited period when working 
on the analysis I was able to go deeper into the material. If the theory gets too much space, the data 
material can easily be adjusted to fit the theory, but this leaves the risk of losing a lot of data on the 
way. During analysis, data will always be lost, but by keeping the theory in the background for a 
while, I was able to focus more on what the interviewees was emphasizing. 
Presenting the findings 
For me, a good presentation of the findings is a presentation where the interviewees can feel that 
they have contributed to the analysis in a positive way, yet the findings belongs to the researcher 
and the findings should not be altered in the presentation on behalf of the interviewees. 
 The interviewees have been very important for my thesis, and have provided me with an 
enormous help. Not only have they given me of their time, but they have been sharing their personal 
experiences, and the interviews sometimes brought up issues that they found it difficult to speak 
about. Still the interviewees went on with the interviews, because they wanted me to hear their 
stories, and use them in my research. Because of this, it is important to me to give them something 
back through the presentation of my research. A young man I interviewed told me that he hoped my 
project will give justice to the Palestinian people and help them to be more effective in their fight. 
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He wanted me to always keep that in mind when working on the project. Throughout the work with 
my thesis, this has been important to me.  
 Some people might see such an obligation toward the interviewees as problematic. The 
researcher should be clear about her role, and not take on the role of an activist during the research. 
She should not uncritically propagate the viewpoint of the interviewees or be reduced to a 
spokesperson for the cause. But this is not what I feel obligated to do either. For me, giving justice 
to the Palestinian people and helping them to be more effective in their fight is better done by 
conducting an academically sound research, that is critical of the interviewees and their opinions 
whenever that is necessary. In that way the world and the Palestinian community can learn as much 
as possible from the study. 
 Even though it is important to give the interviewees sufficient space in the thesis, in the end 
the thesis is, and will always be, the work of the researcher. In my text, I refer to the interviewees 
often, and I use a lot of quotations to illustrate my points, but the opinions presented in the text are 
only my own. When my work is depending directly on one or more interviews, I refer to them 
simply as interviews, or otherwise make it clear through the text, and when nothing else is stated the 
text is based on my own observations from my fieldwork and the work with my analysis. The 
researcher’s opinions, as stated in the final presentation, might sometimes be in conflict with the 
opinions of the interviewees, but it is very important that the interviewees do not feel that their 
information has been misused. In my own thesis, I do not believe there are any big conflicts 
between my own opinions and the opinions of a majority of the interviewees, but I have been very 
careful to make the statements from my interviewees as anonymous as possible. According to 
Thagaard (2009), the ideal for this process is that the interviewees should not even be able to 
recognize their own statements, in this way no interviewees can point to a statement they made or a 
story they told and say that it has been misused. 
 In my presentation I have made one exception to the rule of anonymity. As already 
mentioned, some of my interviewees were representing PLO-institutions, and the view of those 
interviewees must be considered as the general view of the institutions they are representing. In 
these cases, the interviewees’ full names and the organizations they are representing are clearly 
stated in the text.  
Transferability and credibility 
Traditionally, three terms should always be mentioned in the methods chapter, validity, reliability 
and generalization. These three terms refer to the ability of the methods to produce “correct”, or 
scientifically objective answers to the research question, and the importance of the research outside 
of the case. Within social constructivism however, there are no such thing as an objective truth, and 
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moreover these three terms were made for, and are best used within quantitative research. The 
control mechanisms that can be used within quantitative methods are not always successful within 
qualitative methods. Thagaard (2009) argues that we should prefer the terms credibility and 
transferability. Credibility refers to whether the researcher has made the research as transparent as 
possible, so that it can be interpreted on the right basis. This is about describing the methods used, 
revealing the position of the researcher, and in other ways making the reader able to consider the 
role of the researcher in constructing the research results. In other words it is about presenting the 
methods in a clear and truthful way in the methods chapter. Transferability refers to whether the 
research findings can be used to gain new understanding of a broader phenomena, or in other ways 
be transferred to settings other than the original case.  
 The interpretation is the basis for transferability, and the researcher should make it clear how 
the research she has done can be relevant in a bigger setting. The transferability of the case can be 
depending on a lot of factors, but in my thesis I want to focus especially on the ability of other 
people to recognize the interpretation presented in the text. Not all the readers have to agree with 
the way the researcher has interpreted the data, but it is strengthening for the research if other 
people with experience of the phenomena studied find the interpretation agreeable. In this way the 
findings of a research project can give the readers a deeper understanding of phenomena they 
already know (Thagaard 2009). It is my aim to present my findings from this thesis in a clear and 
consistent way, and to identify some key mechanisms of importance to the case, so as to make it 
easier for the readers to use the text to gain a deeper understanding of their own experiences. 
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Chapter 4: 
A background on Palestinians in Egypt: 
Historically, Egypt and Palestine have been very close to each other, not just geographically, but 
economically and politically. Since the rise of Islam, they have been ruled by the same 
administration for long periods, and up until the Ottoman era, trade and migration between the two 
countries were thriving (Hourani 1991). Since the 20tieth century the relations between the two 
countries have been significantly affected by the foundation of the Israeli state and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict (ElAbed 2009, interviews). 
 The role of nationalism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the refugee-movements from 
historical Palestine to Egypt and the relations between Egyptian and Israeli governments are all 
important issues that have had great impact on the relations between Egypt, the Palestinian people 
and the Palestinian institutions. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is very simplified a conflict over 
land and the right to live on it, and nationality has been used by both sides to argue why they belong 
to the land and the land belongs to them. The influx of refugees to Egypt has been minimal, 
compared to Egypt’s large population, but the refugees make up a very important group politically. 
This has to do with the relations between Israeli and Egyptian authorities. From the first 
establishment of Israel, Egypt was one of its key enemies military and ideologically. With the 
signing of the Camp David agreements Egypt gave up fighting Israel by military means, but their 
policies towards the Palestinians in Egypt are still emphasizing that they belong in Palestine as a 
result of their nationality, and that they should ultimately return to Palestine. 
 The Palestinian community in Egypt is not a homogeneous community, but rather a diverse 
group of people. The only thing all the members have in common is that they have some connection 
to Palestine that makes them think of themselves as Palestinian. The Palestinian institutions in 
Egypt are very important because of their role in shaping the Palestinian identity and relations 
between the Palestinians in Egypt and the Egyptian authorities. For many they represent the only 
opportunity to meet other Palestinians outside of their own small circles of families and friends. 
 Even though the Palestinian institutions have a relatively small direct impact on the 
Palestinians in Egypt, they are still very important. Because they are the main representatives of the 
community and their main contact with the Egyptian authorities, the relationship between the 
institutions and the authorities have a direct impact on people’s lives, through the laws they are 
confronted with every day. 
 The chapter starts with an outline of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, with an emphasis on 
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issues such as the relations between Israeli and Egyptian government and Palestinian migration to 
Egypt. The second part of the chapter consists of an introduction on the present Palestinian 
population in Egypt and the main Palestinian institutions. I will discuss the changing relations 
between the PLO-institutions and the Egyptian authorities as well as their significance to 
Palestinians in Egypt. 
The Palestinian – Israeli conflict 
Palestine – From Ottoman to British Colony: 
From the 16
th
 to the 18
th
 century, Palestine was an Ottoman colony. It was important for the 
Ottoman Empire to retain direct control over the colony, because of the importance of the holy 
cities of Jerusalem and Hebron. With the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War 1, the former 
Ottoman Colonies were transferred to the British and French Empires, and Palestine came under 
British rule from 1916 (Hourani 1991). During this period relations with Egypt was good, and trade 
and migrants moved freely across the borders. Many Palestinians went to Egypt seeking business 
opportunities following the Egyptian economic boom at the end of the 19
th
 century (ElAbed 2009).  
 At this time, the nationalist discourse had risen to a hegemonic status in Europe. The idea 
that every nation should rule its own sovereign territory had a lot of support, and it had become 
difficult to imagine another way of organizing states. Together with the increasing discrimination of 
Jews, this made the way for the rise of Zionism, the dream of a sovereign Jewish state in the 
Promised Land of Zion. From the 1880s a new Jewish community was growing in Palestine, 
dreaming of a Jewish nation rooted in the land. In 1897 the first Zionist congress gathered, and 
called for the creation of a home-land for the Jewish people in Palestine. Zionist organizations 
started colonizing the land and buying property through the Jewish National Fund (JNF). This land 
was declared to be the inalienable property of the Jewish people. It could not be sold or rented to 
non-Jews, and no non-Jews could work on it (Hourani 1991). 
 According to Swedenburg (1991, 1990), the Zionist project was seen as a project of taking 
back an empty land for the Jews. The Arab inhabitants were at first seen merely as a part of the 
landscape that needed little attention, but as a result of the Arab resistance to the Zionist projects the 
Zionists launched a massive project aimed at confirming Israeli history of the land and concealing 
Arab history. They were transforming the land through renaming places and through excavations of 
places of significance to the Jewish history. 
 This interpretation draws on the discourse of "belonging as nationality". Because the Jews 
saw themselves as a separate nation, they also needed a separate state. And because historical 
Palestine constituted the promised land of Zion, historical Palestine is where the new state should be 
built. Because the state was a Jewish national-state, every Jew belonged in that state through  
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their membership of the Jewish nation. The Arabs however did not belong to Palestine in specific, 
because within the discourse of "belonging as nationality", their nationality was seen as Arab, and 
so they belonged in the Arab countries, and not in the Promised Land of Zion.  
 By the year 1917 the idea of establishing Jewish national-home in Palestine had got a lot of 
support in Britain, and the Balfour declaration was written. According to Hourani (1991, p.318), 
this declaration “stated that the government viewed with favour the establishment of a Jewish 
national home in Palestine, provided this did not prejudice the religious and civil rights of other 
inhabitants of the country”. This declaration provided for Jewish immigration to Palestine and land 
transfers to Jews on a much bigger scale, and tensions soon became inevitable (ElAbed 2009). 
 13 years later, with the Buraq Rebellion in 1929, came the first serious clashes between the 
Jewish immigrants and the original Palestinian population. Zionist demonstrations near the al-Aqsar 
mosque triggered widespread Arab rioting targeting Jewish communities. Few years later followed 
the 1936-39 rebellion protesting British rule and its pro-Zionist policies (ElAbed 2009). These 
rebellions can be seen as mainly anti-colonial rebellions, and they were very important in 
constructing the Palestinian nation (Swedenburg 2003). From this point in time, nationality has also 
played a vitally important role on the Palestinian side of the conflict. Because the Zionist 
constructed Palestine as an empty land, by referring to the lack of a Palestinian nation, it became 
very important for the Palestinians to construct and confirm their own nation and, following from 
that, their own claims to the land. In this way they could answer the Zionist within the same 
discourse as the Zionists used, and considering the hegemonic status of that discourse, anything else 
might soon have proved useless. Swedenburg (1990, 1991) is describing how memories of the 
Buraq Rebellion are used to construct the history of a national movement, and how nationalist 
signifiers were heavily used for the first time during this rebellion. The Palestinian peasants 
(Fellahin) were made into signifiers of the Palestinian nation, because of their intimate connection 
to the land. 
 The British government made two attempts at resolving the growing tensions. In 1937 it put 
forward a plan to divide historical Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. This was acceptable to 
the Zionists, as it gave them the opportunity to continue to build their nation within their own state, 
but it was unacceptable to the Arabs. In 1939 a new proposal was made, this time to establish a 
government with an Arab majority and limitations to Jewish immigration, but this plan was not 
accepted by the Jews (Hourani 1991). 
 With the end of World War Two, and the massive condemnation of the Holocaust that 
followed it, the Zionist project gained massive support throughout Europe.  At the same time 
Zionist groups launched a massive campaign of violence against the British, aiming to force them to 
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lift restriction on Jewish immigration to Palestine. According to ElAbed (2009), the British was 
unable to handle the conflicts between the Zionist demands, and its obligation to the Arab majority, 
and in February 1947 the British administration decided to hand the problem over to the UN. 
Following this, the UN general assembly passed a resolution recommending the partition of 
Palestine into two states. Again the nationalist discourse played an important part, and the idea of 
one nation - one state was seen as the only viable idea. 
 Almost immediately after the resolution was passed, skirmishes broke out between the 
Israeli Haganah forces and Arab irregular forces, and many Palestinians felt compelled to leave 
their homes and seek refuge in nearby Arab countries even before the official foundation of Israel 
(ElAbed 2009). When I spoke with the interviewees about this, they always stressed that they were 
forced to leave. They told me that many Egyptians believe that they left the land out of their own 
free will, and sold their land to the Israelis. A young man told me that he had read a lot about this 
issue, and found out that only about 1,5% of the Palestinians had actually sold their land, and even 
for them, they had been threatened that if they refused to sell, the Jews would take it from them 
later anyway (Interview Cairo 2009). This was a very important point for many, because it 
demonstrates that they did not leave the land out of their own free will. This is something I will 
come back to several times later in my analysis, both in regards to their "belonging" in the land, and 
in regards to the "guest-metaphor" that I argue is used about them in Egypt. 
The foundation of Israel: 
On the 14
th
 of May 1948 the state of Israel was founded. According to Kook (2000, p. 265), Israel 
was “consciously and by design established as a state for a specific nation, the Jewish nation.” In 
this context Jewishness is no longer seen as a question of religion, but rather as one of nation. The 
Jewish nation developed from the Jewish religion, and has its own culture, tradition and language. 
As Israel is a state for the Jewish nation, the Israeli constitutional arrangements strongly encourages 
the Jewishness of the state, and one of the areas in which this is happening is that of citizenship. 
 The law of return and the nationality law state that every Jew in the world is a member of 
the Jewish nation, and on that basis has the right to live in Israel. The basis for this law is the 
concept of homeland, and the thought that Israel is the homeland of the Jews. According to this 
discourse, all the Jews living outside of Israel are living in a diaspora, and have the right to return to 
their historical homeland. If they choose to do so, they will automatically have the right to acquire 
Israeli citizenship (Kook 2000).   
Although these laws where only put into existence in the early 50's, the nationalist discourse 
behind the laws got big consequences for the Arab inhabitants already from the foundation of Israel 
in 1948. From 1925 every inhabitant of Palestine acquired citizenship to the British mandate of 
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Palestine. However with the foundation of the Israeli state, all non-Jewish inhabitants of the new 
territories automatically lost their citizenship, as the new Israeli citizenship was only granted to 
Jews. Until the coming into force of the Israeli nationality law in 1952 all non-Jewish inhabitants of 
Israel remained stateless. From then on the nationality law required non-Jewish inhabitants of the 
new state to go through a process of naturalization in order to acquire citizenship. This was a very 
difficult process, and many Palestinians remained stateless for many years, and even inherited the 
statelessness to their children and grand-children. In 1968 the requirement where slightly relaxed, 
but it was not until 1980 that another law was passed that made it possible for most of the 
Palestinian inhabitants of Israel to obtain citizenship (Kassim 2000). In this way the Israeli 
representation of them as people that did not belong to the land, was made true through Israeli 
policies, and that is the reason why it has become so important for the Palestinians, and for the Arab 
countries, to construct a strong Palestinian nationality. And through their insistence that the 
Palestinians belonged in what had become Israel, they gained recognition for this, at least for the 
those that remained  on Israel until the time when they obtained citizenship. But those who were 
forced to leave as a result of the 1948-events have never been able to return, and Israel has never 
recognized their claims to the land. 
On the 15
th
 of May 1948, the day after the declaration of the establishment of Israel, Arab 
armies from Transjordan, Syria, Iraq and Egypt entered Palestine in an attempt to save what was left 
of the areas allotted to the Arabs under the UN partition plan (ElAbed 2009). Haganah had launched 
attacks on several Arab cities, both within and outside of the territory allocated for the Israeli state 
by the UN, and the fighting that followed created the first big wave of refugees into the 
neighbouring countries. A woman whose parents experiences this period described the situation like 
this: "The news kept informing us that we just have to be absent for two or three months, and the 
Arab army will enter and kick out the Jews, then they can come back" (Interview Cairo 2009). They 
saw their absence as short term measure to keep them safe during the conflicts, and never dreamed 
that they would not be able to return. And they certainly did not intend to give up their rights to the 
land. Indeed it was common to keep the key to the house, because they thought that they would be 
able to return to the same house, within a limited amount of time. Some of the refugees were able to 
enter Egypt through relatives living in the country, or because they had the necessary financial 
resources, but not many had these options (ElAbed 2009, Interviews Cairo 2009).  
By the time the armistice agreement between Israel and the Arab states was signed in the 
beginning of 1949, Israel had seized 78 % of the territories of historical Palestine, as opposed to the 
55 % that were allotted to them in the UN partition plan. The remaining territories were the West 
Bank and the Gaza strip, of which the West Bank became incorporated into Jordan, and the Gaza 
strip were placed under Egyptian authority. Just like the surrounding Arab countries, these areas 
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took in many refugees from the war and the events before the war, and the refugees thus vastly 
outnumbered the indigenous population, making the areas very crowded (ElAbed 2009). As a result 
of the war about two-thirds of the Arab population were forced to leave their homes as refugees. 
After the war, Israel was unwilling to let them come back, and the British, American and Israeli 
government expected them to be absorbed into the populations of the countries where they settled 
(Hourani 1991).  The Arab states however have resisted this, by actively hindering the Palestinians 
from integrating into their countries, by such means as denying them citizenship and emphasising 
their eventual return to Palestine. 
As a result of the waves of Palestinian refugees out of Palestine, and the influx of Jewish 
migrants to the new Israeli state, the demographic balance after the war was very much in favour of 
the Jews. At this time they started a massive campaign of eradicating any signs of Palestinian 
history in the land, by eradicating Palestinian villages and memorial sites. In this way they were 
denying the Palestinians a national history (Swedenburg 1990, 1991). Within the discourse of 
“belonging as nationality”, this can be seen as a way of denying the Palestinians any rights to the 
land. Any nation needs a national history, and by eradicating the proofs of a national history, Israel 
was seeking to eradicate the Palestinian nation, and thus the claims of the Palestinians that they 
belong to the land. 
Egyptian administration of the Gaza strip: 
The vast influx of refugees into the Gaza strip in 1948-49 created serious economic problems and 
unemployment in the area. The area was administrated as a separate country from Egypt, but in the 
era of Gamal Abd ElNasser’s presidency, starting in 1954, the regulations on migration between 
Egypt and the Gaza strip were relaxed. Starting from the late 1950s, the Egyptian administration 
began encouraging Palestinians to come to Egypt in order to work or continue their education. This 
created a vast influx of Palestinian migrants to Egypt, but this was seen as a short term measure, and 
most of the migrants were never intending to stay in Egypt permanently (ElAbed 2009). 
 In this period tensions between Egypt and Israel were high, and an important source of the 
tension was the influx of Palestinians from the Gaza-strip to Israel consisting of refugees that began 
sneaking across the borders in order to reclaim their possessions. Later events increased the tension, 
and when Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956, this was soon followed by Israeli 
occupation of the Gaza strip, and a joint attack by Israel, France and the UK on the Canal. This war 
ended when Israel withdrew from the Gaza-strip in 1957 after heavy pressure from the USA 
(ElAbed 2009). 
 When nationalism first got a hold in the Arab countries, it was seen as a way towards 
national independence for the Arab countries, through the focus on the right of each nation to 
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govern its own sovereign territory. But in the 1950s and 60s, the focus on each country was 
attempted changed into a focus on Pan-Arabism. This has also been termed Nasserism, as the 
Egyptian president Gamal Abd ElNasser was the front spokesman of the new way (Hourani 1991).  
As the only country that did not yet gain independence from colonial powers, Palestine was a 
cornerstone for Pan-Arabism. The idea was that the Arab nations had to stand together in their 
efforts to liberate historical Palestine from Zionist colonization (ElAbed 2009).  
The 6 day war of 1967: 
In 1967 Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and within 6 days they had 
captured the Gaza strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and the 
West Bank from Jordan. This war created a big wave of refugees from the Gaza strip to Egypt. 
Many people followed the retreat of the Egyptian army, and members of the Gaza administration, 
army and police force were allowed to settle in Egypt. Many were displaced for the second time, 
being refugees from the 1948-events, and again from the war of 1967. But the most significant 
influx of refugees from the Gaza strip to Egypt came from an Israeli initiative which swept the Gaza 
strip for any men with possible connection to Palestinian resistance groups, and left them on the 
Egyptian border. The Egyptian government had no choice but to accept the refugees and many were 
recruited to the armed forces (ElAbed 2009). A young woman described the process like this: 
"My father came to Egypt in 67. He was a young man. He was deported together with 
other young men. It was a lot of controversy around this group, as they were deported 
without any reason. That is, to the degree that they went in the same clothes they were 
wearing. My father used to tell me that they were in the camp and they called for them in 
microphones, youth from that age to that age, to be collected in one place. They took 
them. They were evacuated to more than one Arabic country, and Abd El Nasser agreed 
that they could come to Egypt. They first got to a place called Muddirayat El Tahrir, close 
to Kafr El Sheikh in the north of Egypt. After that the PLO began to see what their 
specializations were, and after that my father started working with the PLO. He worked 
as a representative for the PLO in the Palestinian Women’s Union." (Interview Cairo 
2009) 
These deportations were experienced as completely arbitrary, and the story also shows how little 
warning the young men were given before they had to leave. The official Israeli story is that 
supporters of the PLO were deported, but in reality they deported all the young men in their way. 
For those who came to Egypt, the Egyptian government took care of them by placing them in the 
army, or employing them within the PLO (ElAbed 2009, interviews Cairo 2009). 
 In addition to all the refugees that came into Egypt as a result of the war, the economic 
migrants that were encouraged to come during the previous years were now unable to return to 
Gaza. It is estimated that about 30 000 Palestinians were living in Egypt in 1969, as opposed to 
about 15 000 in 1960. (ElAbed 2009).  
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The Camp David Agreements and changing relations between the Egyptian government 
and the PLO/Palestine: 
The 6 day war ended in a cease fire agreed upon in the United Nations, but the relations between the 
two countries were far from peaceful. In the following years there was a series of military incidents 
along the Suez Canal, and on the 6
th
 of October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a joint surprise 
attack on Israel. They soon captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. However Israel, 
with American aid, regained the dominance, and by the ceasefire at the 25
th
 of October, Israel had 
gained control of big Syrian and Egyptian territories. The war ended with the intervention of the 
UN, partly caused by a blockage on oil-supply from the OPEC-countries, which forced Israel to 
withdraw from Egyptian and Syrian territories (Hourani 1991). 
 The October war became a turning point in the relations between Egypt and Israel. As a 
result, the first serious negotiations between Egypt and Israel were set out, and these ended in the 
Camp David agreements that were signed in September the following year. The terms of the 
agreements secured Egyptian control of the Sinai Peninsula, and the first steps towards a 
establishing a Palestinian state in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza strip (Hourani 
1991, ElAbed 2009). 
 The Camp David Agreement made an important turning point for the relations between the 
Palestinian organisations, most notable the PLO, and the Egyptian government. Until this time they 
had been cooperating closely, and shared the hope to defeat Israel by military means. By signing the 
Camp David Agreement the Egyptian government alienated themselves from the Palestinians, and 
from most of the Arab world. According to an interviewee this was followed by a change of the 
official representations of Egyptians in matters such as football and promotion for tourists. From 
representing themselves mainly as Arabs, the attention were turned more and more towards their 
older history, and they started representing themselves as descendants of the Pharaohs.  
 In the economic sphere, the takeover of Abd ElNasser, had lead Egypt to rely on a socialist 
economic model, but the war in 1967 for the first time revealed severe problems with the Egyptian 
economy. This was the start of a more Western orientation of the economy, and after the Camp 
David Agreements, this development gained speed, when Sadat started a new Open Door policy in 
the hopes of attracting foreign investment (Utvik 1990, ElAbed 2009, interviews Cairo 2009). 
The Palestinian Community in Egypt: 
The estimates of how many Palestinians are living in Egypt today are highly inaccurate, and ranges 
between 50000 to 70000. According to ElAbed (2009, p6) "no reliable statistics can be found for 
the Palestinians. The Egyptian government either does not have records on Palestinians, as some 
officials have claimed, or (what is more likely) it considers the disclosure of such data to impinge 
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on state security." She further states that the Palestinians in Egypt are scattered across most of the 
Northern governorates of the country, and that there are few largely Palestinian villages or 
neighbourhoods. Indeed the scattered nature of the Palestinian population in Egypt seems to be one 
of its main characteristics. Not only are they dispersed around the country, but those living in Cairo 
are also spread across big parts of the city, with few gathering points. There are some areas with 
more Palestinians in them, but even in these areas the Palestinian population is a small minority. 
The geographical scatteredness also reflects the economic reality of the Palestinians, as they live 
where they can afford to live. Indeed an interviewee told me that most of the Palestinians in Cairo 
lives in the upper class areas of Heliopolis and Nasr City, but then another interviewee present at the 
time immediately corrected him and told me that not many Palestinians can afford living in these 
areas, so that even though these may be preferred areas among the Palestinian population, this is not 
reflected in the actual settlement patterns. 
 This reflects the big economic differences within the Palestinian population in Egypt. A few 
of them, notably those with high positions within the PLO or the PLO–connected institutions, are 
very rich. These people are also very visible, as the formal representation of the Palestinian people 
in Egypt. However the big majority of Palestinians in Egypt are either middle class or poor, but 
these are not as visible because they are often confused with Egyptians (ElAbed 2009). 
 The diversity of the Palestinian population in Egypt, both geographically and economically 
makes the Egyptian case significantly different from the cases of for example Jordan, Lebanon and 
Syria, where the Palestinians live clustered together in refugee camps. But the absence of camps 
affects more than just settlement patters. For Palestinians in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, the camps 
represents Palestinian places, where the Palestinian community is gathered, and a focus for their 
Palestinian identity, while in Egypt most Palestinians have little knowledge of other Palestinians 
outside of their personal circles of families and friends. Many Palestinians living outside of Cairo 
are not even aware of the PLO-institutions and the services they offer, so they completely lack a 
gathering place where they can meet other Palestinians (ElAbed 2009). But for the Palestinians that 
do use the PLO-institutions, they are very important. For these people the PLO-institutions are 
places where they can meet other Palestinians, learn about Palestine and even about the Palestinian 
community in Egypt. For this reasons, the PLO-institutions represents the only gathering points 
where the Palestinians can come together as a community. In addition the PLO-institutions are 
vitally important, in that they are the only kind of formal representation of the Palestinians in Egypt. 
PLO-institutions and the Palestinian Embassy in Egypt 
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) has maintained a presence in Egypt from its start in 
1964 until today, however the scope and nature of the presence have varied with time.  The PLO-
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head offices were established in Cairo in 1965. They were running welfare programs, and helped 
local Palestinians solve bureaucratic problems, in addition to fulfilling many of the functions of an 
embassy. Before the move to Gaza in 1993, they were the largest employer of Palestinians in Egypt. 
The PLO also offered its employees regular incomes, pensions, free education up to the university 
level and reduced university fees for their children, and subsidized or free health care at the 
Palestinian Hospital. When PLO moved most of its activities to Gaza in 1993, the offices were 
transformed into the Palestinian Embassy in Cairo. The embassy's main tasks include issuing 
Palestinian passports, facilitating the transfer of wounded from Gaza to Egypt for medical 
treatment, securing entry permits from Israel for travellers to Gaza and helping Palestinians get the 
necessary permits for entering Egypt. Two of the employees of the embassy highlighted the help the 
embassy is providing to the Palestinian people in Egypt, such as helping students applying for 
university, and helping Palestinian families to pay the school fees for their children. The embassy is 
the official representative of Palestinians in Egypt, and the main channel for solving Palestinian 
problems, as well as promoting the view of the Palestinians regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
and other matters of importance to the Palestinian government (ElAbed 2009, interviews Cairo 
2009). 
 Apart from the head offices, and later the Embassy, PLO are running several institution of 
vital important for the Palestinian community in Cairo. These institutions have two main causes, to 
mobilize people for the Palestinian cause, and to serve the local communities. They have included 
the General Union for Palestinian Students (GUPS), The General Union for Palestinian Workers 
(GUPW), the General Union for Palestinian Women (GUPWom), the Palestinian Red Crescent 
Society and several smaller institutions. They all have their head offices in Cairo, and their reach 
out of the city is very limited  (ElAbed 2009, interviews Cairo 2009). 
  
The General Union for Palestinian Students (GUPS) was formed in 1959, when the Palestinian 
Student Union in Egypt, which was founded in 1952 by Yasser Arafat and his comrades, joined with 
other Palestinian student unions throughout the Arab world. It did not become a part of the PLO 
until Fatah’s take over in 1969. It used to be the most important PLO-unit in Egypt, and its activities 
went far beyond ordinary student politics. They met with state-leaders, and in 1965 they organized 
an international symposium on Palestine attended by political leaders and intellectuals from 58 
countries. In addition it had a strong focus on mass-mobilizations and activism, but it was this 
mobilization and activism that ultimately got it into trouble. In 1972 Egypt experienced massive 
riots protesting Sadat's policies, and especially the ambiguous relations with Israel at the time. The 
government saw the Palestinians as being in the forefront of the demonstrations, and that resulted in 
mass-detentions of Palestinians. In 1975 the GUPS arranged demonstrations against the Sinai II 
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agreements, and this lead to deportations of many Palestinian students and sharp limitations on 
GUPS activities. The union was closed by the government in 1977, at the same time as Sadat visited 
Jerusalem, an event that is widely seen as a turning point in the government relations to Israel and 
Palestine (ElAbed 2009). 
 
The General Union for Palestinian Workers (GUPW) has been in existence since 1963, and its 
mandate is “To defend the rights of Palestinian workers in Cairo” (Interview with Yussuf 
ElNemnem, head of the GUPW, Cairo 2009). They have 11000 members, representing 40 different 
occupations, and help their members in all kinds of issues regarding their work. When I visited they 
had little activities, but rather waited for members to come to them in seek of assistance. 
 
The General Union for Palestinian Women (GUPWom) was established in 1963 by Samira Abu 
Ghazalah, who was a Palestinian studying in Egypt. She established the union as a gathering place 
for Palestinians. The members are Palestinian women over 18 years of age, and Egyptian women 
married to Palestinian men. Their aim is to help Palestinian Women living in Egypt, and to keep the 
Palestinian culture alive in Egypt. They are running the Choral Abbed El Shams choir, they engage 
young women in production of Palestinian embroidery, and they are hosting events related to 
Palestine and Palestinians in Egypt. When I visited they had recently restarted a cultural committee, 
committed to promoting Palestinian culture and understanding of issues central to the Palestinian 
cause. The Union is strongly oriented towards providing services to the Palestinian community, and 
that is its main way of attracting members, but it also focuses a lot on conserving, and teaching 
about, Palestinian culture (ElAbed 2009, Observations and interviews Cairo 2009). 
  
The Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) is a part of the international Red Cross/Red Crescent 
Society, and it also has ties to the PLO. The Egyptian branch is a part of the Egyptian Red Crescent 
society, and has its headquarters in Heliopolis in Cairo. They are running the Palestinian hospital in 
Cairo, which in addition to being a normal hospital open to all inhabitants of Egypt, is also serving 
Palestinians from Gaza and providing training for Palestinian doctors. They also run a Palestinian 
cultural centre, containing a heritage exhibition and a theatre, and they are running the Fallujah 
folkloric group, which consist of a choir and a dance team (Interview with Mai, head of the PRCS 
Cairo branch, Cairo 2009). In 1983 they opened the Fallujah Nursing Institute which is training 
nurses, technicians and paramedics, and the hospital includes a recruitment centre for qualified 
graduates. The hospital provides free care to a large section of Palestinians, and they are an 
important source of employment (ElAbed 2009).  
 The hospital is perhaps the single most important gathering place for Palestinians in Egypt, 
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but both the GUPWom and the PRCS play vitally important roles. The Embassy and the GUPW are 
less important. They are still places to seek help, and places where Palestinians are employed, but 
they are not as important as gathering places. Both the GUPWom and the PRCS are having regular 
arrangements that gather many Palestinians, and the Fallujah and Choral Abd ElShams is very 
important gathering places for the youths that constitutes them. The folkloric groups are places 
where the youths meet on a regular basis, usually ones a week, to practise together and meet other 
Palestinians. They are open for all Palestinian youth, and the threshold to getting in is relatively 
small. For many of my interviewees, these groups were important places to meet other Palestinians, 
and they the most important among the few meeting places for young Palestinians in Egypt. Other 
groups have also existed, but none of my interviewees could tell me about any other youth groups 
existing today.  
Changing relationships between the Egyptian authorities and the PLO-institutions: 
Egypt was central in the emergence of the first Palestinian institutions in the early 1960's. Nasser 
was a big supporter of the Palestinian case, and his efforts were crucial in establishing PLO as the 
main Palestinian organization. But Nasser's support of the Palestinian institutional development was 
always subordinated to larger political aims, both in strengthening his position in relation to the 
other Arab states and in co-opting Palestinian mobilization and bringing it under his control 
(ElAbed). 
 In 1970 PLO started criticizing Nasser for his handling of the conflict with Israel, and this 
led to the first serious fallouts between the PLO and the Egyptian government. Several smaller 
institution was closed down, but Nasser remains popular among the Palestinians. He is still 
remembered for favouring them in his politics, and treating the Palestinians in Egypt a pare with 
Egyptian nationals, and for his intervention in the conflicts between PLO and the Jordanian regime. 
His last act before his death was to broker a truce between King Hussein of Jordan and Yasser 
Arafat, thereby ending the most acute phase of the conflict (ElAbed 2009, interviews 2010). 
 The relations between the PLO and the Egyptian government continued to be good for a 
while after Nasser's death, but in 1975, with the Sinai II agreements and the protests of the GUPS, 
they started to deteriorate. The Sinai II agreements later led to the Camp David Agreements that 
declared peace between Egypt and Israel, and is seen as a major turning point in Egypt's relations to 
the Palestinians. Two years later Sadat made a visit to Jerusalem, acknowledging Israeli control of 
the city, thus signifying his final break with the Palestinian cause (ElAbed 2009). 
 In 1979, the signing of the Camp David Agreements caused the formal break between Egypt 
and the PLO. Later Egypt has endeavoured to play a more active role in the peace process and 
restoring their relations with the PLO, but this has made little impact on the status of the 
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Palestinians in Egypt. After the break with the authorities, the PLO-institutions' presence was 
greatly diminished, and they have never regained their previous importance. This was accentuated 
by the move of many PLO-activities to Palestine with the establishment of the Palestinian National 
Authorities (PNA/PA) in 1993. Since this the orientation of the remaining institution has been much 
more local and less political, as the only organizations that survived the break did so as a result of 
their careful avoidance of any political activities. Today the institutions function as gathering places 
in force of their history, and in lack of alternatives, but they have lost most of the political role they 
had in the start. 
 The changes in the relations between the government and the PLO-institutions have been 
followed by changes in the laws regarding Palestinians in Egypt, causing big changes in the lives of 
individual Palestinians. In the time of Abd El Nasser Palestinians were treated as Egyptian 
nationals, and many looks back at this time as a good time for the Palestinians in Egypt. But the 
times were changing, and after the signing of the Camp David Agreements and the following 
disagreements between the government and the PLO, the laws that treated Palestinians as Egyptian 
national were gradually changed. In 1979 the Egyptian cultural minister Abu ElSidal was killed by 
Palestinian extremists, and at the same time a massive media-campaign was initiated against the 
Palestinians. The campaign focused on the Palestinians as guests, and everything Egypt had done 
for them, both in terms of receiving them in their country, and in terms of the wars they had fought. 
They portrayed the Palestinians as ungrateful because of their protests against the peace agreements. 
These two events became turning points in the public relations to the Palestinians, and following 
this most of the regulations that treated Palestinians as equals with Egyptian nationals were nullified 
(ElAbed 2009, interviews Cairo 2009). 
 These changes demonstrates how the Palestinians are subject to events far out of their 
control. As belonging to the same nationality, they are seen as one group, and everybody is held 
responsible for the actions of everyone else in the group. As leaders and formal representatives of 
the group, the PLO is given immense power over the lives of all Palestinians, even though their 
policies is not necessarily wanted by a majority of the Palestinians. 
 
"Belonging as nationality" has been important in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli, because it is 
to such a large degree a conflict about control over territory, and the claims of the Palestinian and 
Israeli nations to the land. In order to strengthen the Palestinian claims to the land, the building of a 
Palestinian nation with claims to the land has been in focus. The emergence of institutions that were 
claiming to represent the Palestinian nation was important in this context, and one of the main tasks 
of the PLO-institutions has been to uplift the Palestinian nation, both through nation building and 
through demanding a voice for the nation. Because of the role the PLO-institutions have had in 
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building and representing the Palestinian nation, and because of their changing relations with the 
Egyptian government, their impact on the lives of Palestinians in Egypt have been severe. For those 
who have embraced their Palestinian nationality, they remain a focus point among a diverse 
population. For all Palestinians they remain important because of the impact their relations with the 
government have had on the conditions for their stay in Egypt. 
For the members of Choral Abd ElShams and AlFalluja the discourses on nationality that are 
prevalent within the PLO-institutions are important. They are people that are interested in learning 
about Palestine and emphasising their Palestinian identity, and what they learn in the PLO-affiliated 
groups are important for their conceptions of their national identity. Yet they also found their 
nationality problematic, especially when they were confronted with it in situations where they were 
treated as foreigners. In many cases they were pulled between the wish of being Palestinians and 
maintaining their national identity, and their wish for having an easier life with an Egyptian 
nationality. The next chapter is focusing on their experiences in Egypt, their encounters with the 
foreigner laws and their attempts, or lack of such, to return to Palestine. 
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Chapter 5: 
The Political Construction of Host-country 
and Home-land; Experiences in exile 
Home-land and host-country are important concepts in the "belonging as nationality" discourse. 
They are important for how we understand migration, and as such for how we construct the subject-
position of migrants. The place the migrants are moving from is constructed as their home. This is a 
place where they belong, and where they make the rules. The place they are moving to is 
constructed as the host-country. In this place they are guests, and as guests they should accept the 
rules of the host or leave. By using these metaphors, belonging to a place is effectively reduced to 
be a question of nationality and nothing else. A migrant might live in the host-country as a refugee 
or a guest-worker, or because of connections to things, places or people in that country. But within 
the discourse of "belonging as nationality", this is irrelevant. The important thing is that the 
migrants are guests in their host-country and at home in another country, respective of their 
nationality. 
 In Egypt, the notion of being a host-country for "displaced" Palestinians have been, and 
continue to be, politically important. It is important for the Egyptian authorities, because it is a 
means to construct beneficial power-relations with the Palestinian community. And it is important 
for the Palestinian leadership because it presupposes Palestine as the place where the Palestinians 
belong and should return to. The Israeli authorities however, are arguing that Palestinians do not 
belong specifically in historical Palestine. They are also utilizing the discourse of "belonging as 
nationality", but they use this discourse to argue that Jews belong in Israel, as Israel is the Jewish 
nation, while Palestinians belong anywhere in the Arab world, because Palestine does not qualify as 
a separate nation.  
 Discourses are primarily used to describe and interpret phenomena, but the way we interpret 
different phenomena have vital importance for how we deal with them. When Palestinians are 
described as guests in Egypt, they are also treated as guests, and this has obvious impacts on their 
rights in the country. In the same way, when Israeli authorities claim that the Palestinians that have 
left historical Palestine do not belong there, that is also used as a basis for denying them entry to the 
country. On this background I ask the following question: 
 How has the discourse of "belonging as nationality" been used to describe and determine the 
relations of Palestinians living in Egypt to Palestine and Egypt? 
The chapter is starting by discussing the rights of Palestinians in four different areas: citizenship, 
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residence, work and education. Their rights within these areas are very important for their 
experience of belonging or being marginalized because the regulations of them have a serious 
impact on their lives. The second part of the chapter discuss their experiences of how Palestine has 
been constructed as their home-land by the Egyptian authorities and the PLO, at the same time as 
they are denied access to the country by Israeli authorities. 
 The chapter will primarily discuss how my interviewees experience the statements and 
actions of the Egyptian and Israeli authorities, as well as the Palestinian leadership. In other words 
the discourses and practices that are forced upon them from above. The next chapter will focus on 
how they relate to this, and how they use the discourses in their own lives. 
The rights of Palestinians in Egypt: 
Citizenship 
Under Egyptian citizenship laws, citizenship is determined by Jus Sanguinis, that is inheritance. 
Because of this it is impossible to become an Egyptian citizen by naturalization, and this affects the 
Palestinian population in Egypt greatly, because they "can't obtain the citizenship (….......). When 
both of your parents are Palestinian, it's impossible they say, it's no way to think about that" 
(Interview Cairo 2009).  
 Family and kinship traditionally play an important role in Arab societies, and descent 
through the male line determines a person’s identity according to these factors. When a woman 
marries she remains a member of her own kinship group, but she is also taken up as a member in 
her husband’s kinship group, and she takes up some parts of his family’s identity. Kinship is also 
central to the political system in most Arab countries, and the family is seen as the ideal basis of the 
nation (Joseph 1996). The importance of family, kinship and patriarchy is evident in Egyptian 
citizenship laws. The only option for someone who is born without Egyptian citizenship to gain it is 
through marriage, and it is only open for women. Traditionally the women enter their husband’s 
families when they get married, and take on the husband’s status, and this is also the case in Egypt, 
where women that are married to Egyptian men for a minimum of two years gain the right to 
Egyptian citizenship. This is not the case for men that are married to Egyptian women. Even more 
importantly citizenship is inherited from father to child. So if the father of the child is Egyptian, the 
child will automatically have Egyptian citizenship, while before 2005 children with Egyptian 
mothers did not get Egyptian citizenship (ElAbed 2009, interviews Cairo 2009). 
 The citizenship laws have a lot to say on the lives of the Palestinian people in Egypt, 
because as nationality is passed down from father to child, so is statelessness. Because of this it is 
not unusual to find people that have been living in Egypt all their lives, and still do not have 
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Egyptian citizenship. Indeed many of the Palestinians in Egypt have never even been to Palestine! A 
person is considered as a Palestinian by Egyptian law if the person’s father’s father was a 
Palestinian. This means that 3 of your grandparents might be Egyptian and have Egyptian 
citizenship, but you might still find yourself without citizenship, because the fourth of your 
grandparents was a stateless Palestinian (ElAbed 2009). 
After Egypt signed the CEDAW
1
-convention for elimination of discrimination of women the 
laws where changed. Today children of Egyptian mothers can apply for citizenship (ElAbed 2009, 
interviews). For children born by Egyptian mothers after 2005, getting Egyptian citizenship is a 
relatively uncomplicated process, but this far no Palestinian born before 2005 have been granted 
citizenship by the new law. This makes one of my interviewees state: 
"I just have one question for the Egyptian government. Why do they give the nationality 
for any people, they say that if the mother is Egyptian, you can take the Egyptian 
nationality, but not for Palestinians?" (Interview Cairo 2009) 
Ever since the massive expulsion of Palestinians from historical Palestine in 1948, the Arab League 
has emphasized that a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem must ensure the refugees' rights to 
return to their homes. The Arab League has advised national governments to defer efforts to settle 
Palestinians in their host-countries, and it has called on the UN to give the Palestinians the 
opportunity to return home (ElAbed 2009). In Egypt the government has followed the Arab League 
suggestions, by limiting the possibilities for Palestinians to get Egyptian citizenship as much as 
possible. For a long time the country was unwilling to sign the CEDAW-convention and one of the 
reasons given was that it would give many more Palestinians the right to obtain Egyptian 
citizenship. Even after the convention was signed they were slow to implement it in the case of 
Palestinians, and the cases of Palestinians that have applied for citizenship by the new law have 
been treated differently than the cases of people from other nationalities (ElAbed 2009, interviews 
Cairo 2009). This reflects the governments continued unwillingness to grant Egyptian citizenship to 
Palestinians. 
 Big sections of the Palestinian leadership in Egypt is agreeing with the government on this, 
and even putting pressure on them to stop Palestinians from getting Egyptian citizenship. I 
interviewed both the leader of the GUPW and the previous governor of Gaza city under Fatah 
authorities, and they both expressed their concern that Palestinians should not have other 
citizenships than the Palestinian citizenship. They were afraid that the Israeli government would 
say: "Where is the Palestinian people? There is no Palestinian people, these people are Egyptian, 
                                                 
1 CEDAW-treaty, conference on elimination of discrimination of women. 
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Lebanese and so on" (Interviews Cairo 2009). 
 
The unwillingness to give Palestinians Egyptian citizenship has its root in the concept of "belonging 
as nationality". When the Jews first decided to make their homeland in historical Palestine, they 
emphasized the need of the Jewish nation to have their own sovereign homeland. At that time the 
idea of nationality was not as widespread in Palestine, and Palestinians could hardly be seen as a 
nation as such. At this time the Jews used the concept of "belonging as nationality" to explain why 
they belonged in historical Palestine, while the Palestinians did not belong there any more than in 
another part of the Arab world. Since they did not have a nationality that connected them to the 
land, they could just as well live in any other Arab country. It was these statements that the Arab 
League wanted to prove wrong, and they did so by stating that the Palestinians do not belong in 
their host-countries, but should return to their home-country at all costs. It became utmost important 
to construct a Palestinian national identity, in order to uphold the Palestinian claims to the land 
(ElAbed 2009, Swedenburg 2003). 
 In addition to this, the Egyptian government is treating nationality as synonymous with 
citizenship, and they fear that if the Palestinian people are granted citizenship to other countries 
than Palestine they will lose their Palestinian nationality, and thus the right to return to Palestine. 
Many of my interviewees however were careful about maintaining a division between citizenship 
and nationality. They stated that gaining a non-Palestinian citizenship would be a tool for them to 
make their daily life easier, but it would not change their nationality: 
"I've got the Jordanian nationality. But I never say I'm a Jordanian. Never! I'm 
Palestinian, because Nablus is in Palestine. In my feelings I am Palestinian, so this 
passport is only to  go to the airport, or some travels, nothing about my nationality, my 
belief or my actions." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
The woman that made this statement says that she has the Jordanian nationality, and then later states 
that it has nothing to do with her nationality. This is because she, as most of my interviewees, uses 
the English term nationality to cover both nationality and citizenship, but she is still able to describe 
the difference between the two. If you exchange the word nationality with citizenship in the first 
sentence, the statement makes perfect sense. 
 However the same woman upheld some connection between nationality and citizenship. She 
is eligible to apply for Egyptian citizenship because she is married to an Egyptian man, but she 
wants to keep her Jordanian citizenship because she feels it is more in line with her nationality. She 
is originally from the West Bank, which was previously a part of Jordan, and as such her Jordanian 
citizenship reflects the fact that she is from the West Bank. However other people stated that there 
was no connection between their nationality and citizenship at all. To some degree these differences 
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arise from different experiences of not having Egyptian citizenship. Those who experienced severe 
difficulties were more likely to wish for Egyptian citizenship, yet denying that this had anything to 
do with their nationality. 
 Not having Egyptian citizenship has serious implications for people that are living in Egypt 
over time. Anyone who does not have Egyptian citizenship is regarded as a foreigner, and subject to 
special foreigner’s regulations. The most important of these regulations applies to the fields of 
residence, work and education, even though there are many regulations regarding foreigner’s 
activities in Egypt outside of these fields too. 
Residency: 
All foreigners in Egypt need a residence permit in order to stay legally in the country. Resident 
permits for Palestinians are valid for a period of 1 to 5 years according to the type of permit. People 
that do not have resident permits, or that fail to renew them in time can be subjected to deportation, 
or if deportation is impossible, they can be detained in prison. As an example of this I was told a 
story of a man who was 80 years old and had been living in Egypt for many years. He was 
originally from Palestine, but he did not have any opportunities to return to Palestine, and so he did 
not have any other choice than to stay in Egypt. Yet at the time of my fieldwork, he had lost his 
residence permit, thus being forced to stay illegally in Egypt, and as a consequence he had been 
spending several months in prison (Interview Cairo 2009). 
 This illustrates the severity of the consequences of not having a residence permit, but it also 
illustrates an important point in Egyptian immigration policies. It is not enough for an immigrant 
not to be able to leave the country. The immigrants are in Egypt on the approval of the authorities, 
and if the authorities withdraw their approval they are themselves responsible of finding somewhere 
else to go. This approach completely ignores the fact that many immigrants are not staying in Egypt 
out of their own free will. In the case of Palestinians they are mostly refugees or people that are 
trapped in Egypt by events far out of their own control.  
 
There are several ways of obtaining an Egyptian residence permit. For those who have Egyptian 
mothers, wives or husbands, the process is relatively easy. The fact that their relatives are living in 
Egypt is considered enough reason for them to stay there. They have to pay to renew their permits 
every three to five years and the process can involve a lot of bureaucracy and bad treatment, but the 
permits are always granted within a reasonable time. This is opposed to people that apply for other 
reasons, were I heard about a man who had spent two years to get his residence permit, and then the 
permit was only valid for one year.  (Interviews Cairo 2009). 
 Those who do not have close Egyptian relatives can gain a residence permit through their 
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work or studies in the country, or through a pension from the Egyptian government. Children whose 
parents have legal residence can also gain residence through their parents, and the same is true of 
people that have spouses with legal residence. For those who work in, or have pensions from, the 
government, gaining resident permits is not a big problem. Their work or pension is already 
documented because it is coming from the government, and from that follows their right to stay in 
the country. The few people who have formal employment in the private sector are also able to 
document their work without problems, and as such their reason to stay. But the majority of 
Palestinians in Egypt have informal employment. It is in the nature of such employment that it is 
difficult to document, because it usually happens without a contract, and the workers do not pay 
taxes or have insurance. In short, informal employment is employment that is either on the edge of 
what is legal or beyond it, and as such it does not constitute a reason to stay in the country. One 
option for people with informal employment is to get someone they know to state that they are 
working for them. This does not entail actual work, but is only a statement to the government in 
order to obtain the residence permit. Obtaining a residence permit in this way makes the holder very 
vulnerable every time the permit has to be renewed, because he is depending upon the other person 
to give him the papers, and this makes the power relations between the two very unequal thus 
opening for exploitation. Other options are having investment work in Egypt, or having 
considerable amounts of money in an Egyptian bank, but these options are both very expensive and 
thus not open for most Palestinians (ElAbed 2009, Interviews Cairo 2009). 
 The story of a young Palestinian man is a good example of the complexities of the 
regulations. His mother came to Egypt as a refugee just before he was born, and he has been living 
in Egypt the whole of his life. His mother has a pension from the Egyptian government, because his 
father was killed while serving in the Egyptian army, and that makes her eligible for a residence 
permit. Until he became 21 years old, he obtained his residence permit through his mother, but after 
that he has got to have legal work in order to obtain the permit. Because of financial constraints he 
quit school early and started doing different jobs in the informal sector. He has been working as a 
salesman in the markets, as a painter, and in a factory, but all these jobs were done without any 
contracts or other kind of formalization. Every time he has to renew his permit, he has got to find 
someone to verify to the government that he has got a job, even though he is not actually working 
for them. He told me that there is a lot of bureaucracy and long procedures involved in getting the 
permit, but as long as you are not politically active or working for liberating Palestine, you will 
always get it in the end (Interview Cairo 2009). 
 There are several interesting factors in this story. First of all he had all his childhood in 
Egypt, but when he turned 21 he was expected to find somewhere else to go if he could not obtain 
formal work. He does not have a residence permit in Palestine, and for the last few years he has 
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been unable to go there. The only way he could go to live in Palestine is by becoming an illegal 
immigrant there, yet he is expected by the Egyptian government to go and live in Palestine if he 
cannot find work in Egypt. As many other he gets his income from informal work, but for him it 
was not an option to move to Palestine. So he chose to find someone he knows to confirm for the 
government that he has a job. Off course this does not change the fact that he has not got a formal 
job, but it is the only way for him to be able to remain in the country legally. The whole procedure 
of getting someone to confirm that he has a job, even though he does not is off course not how the 
laws are meant to work, but it is usually not a basis for rejecting the application. However if you are 
politically active, working for liberating Palestine, or doing something else that the government 
does not like, they can easily deny you a permit on these grounds. Thus it gives the government an 
opportunity to strike down on activities that they do not like, even if they are not illegal. 
Work: 
There are many regulations regarding work for foreigners in Egypt. In the past, Palestinians were 
exempted from most of these regulations, but today that is not the case anymore. All foreigners have 
to obtain work-permits to work in the formal sector, and there is a tight regulation on which 
professions it is possible to obtain permits within. 
 Since 1978 employment of foreigners in the public sector has been subject to principles of 
reciprocity. That is, for every foreigner employed by the Egyptian government, the foreigner’s 
home-country has to employ an Egyptian citizen. This is effectively banning stateless people from 
having jobs in the public sector, because they have no state that can employ Egyptians “back 
home”. In effect people with Palestinian citizenship are usually affected too, because the Palestinian 
government is too small to employ a considerable amount of foreigners. Those who were employed 
in the public sector before the law was enacted were able to keep their jobs and the benefits that 
follow from them, but no new work-permits for public sector jobs are given out to Palestinians 
today (ElAbed 2009, interviews Cairo 2009). 
 In the private sector the regulations are also very strict. Work permits are only granted 
within certain, usually low skilled, professions, such as for example painters, salesmen or factory 
workers. For example Palestinian students graduating from the Pharmacy-college cannot obtain 
work-permits within their professions. The only way they can obtain work-permits is if they decide 
to work in a different sector from the one they are educated in, usually an unskilled sector. This is 
also the case with many other university graduates (ElAbed 2009, interviews Cairo 2009). 
 Another important regulation is the law that states that no company in the private sector is 
allowed to have more than 10 % foreign employees. In addition the law requires foreigners to have 
health insurance. This is a major problem, because most companies do not grant health insurance to 
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their workers, and before they can grant insurance to a foreign worker, they have to grant insurance 
to 9 Egyptians. So if a company wants to employ 10 % foreigners, as the law allows them to, they 
have to provide all their workers with insurance. This is off course a major expense for the 
companies, and so they prefer to hire only Egyptians. If they do hire foreigners, they only hire high-
skilled workers that are difficult to find among Egyptians (ElAbed 2009, interviews Cairo 2009).  
 Because of these limitations, many Palestinians are not able to find formal work in Egypt. In 
most cases these people are forced to take up informal work. Informal work is work that is not 
regulated by the government. In most developed countries this is strictly illegal, but because of the 
government's failure to formalize big parts of the private sector, it is accepted in a lot of 
underdeveloped countries. It is estimated that more than 50 % of the non-agricultural workforce in 
Egypt work in the informal sector
2
, and for Palestinians the percentage is even higher. A young 
journalist explained her work like this: 
"I didn't obtain a work permit till now, and I didn't even try to get it. If I'm going to work 
in school for example, or in any governmental institutions, I have to have the work 
permit. - But in private institutions you don't? - No, they didn't ask me about anything. I 
mean, I didn't even sign a contract."  (Interview Cairo 2009) 
This is a typical example of informal work, where the employers do not ask about papers from the 
employee, and in return the employee is expected to work without a contract. Often this kind of 
work does not make the employee eligible for a pension or a sick leave and the job security is very 
low.  Another interviewee phrased it this way: "...they (Palestinians) sometimes have to work with 
less legitimacy than other workers" (Interview Cairo 2009). In this example being Palestinian 
means being on the outside, not being able to make any demands. For the journalist, just the fact 
that she is a Palestinian means that she has no hope of getting a work permit, or any of the benefits 
that comes with it. In this way, the laws are confirming her role as an outsider, someone who does 
not have the same rights as the insiders. 
 Not being able to get formal work also means to have to accept work at a lower pay. A 
graduate from a business school told me that she had severe troubles finding a job after she 
graduated. After a while she got a position as a secretary in an institution she liked, and she was 
very happy about it, but as she started working there she felt that her work was not properly valued. 
Because she is not able to find work in other places, she has to accept a salary much lower than she 
would have if she could find any formal work. And even after working full time in the same place 
for 6 years, she is still depending on her parents for her living, because her salary is too small for 
her to live on her own (Interview Cairo 2009). 
                                                 
2 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/711/ec1.htm 
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 A student told me that he did not have any motivation for studying well, because: "If I get 
high grades, I will not be appointed in the University. I cannot be appointed as a professor. It 
cannot happen, because I am a Palestinian." (Interview Cairo 2009). 
 I also spoke with some women that had given up finding work completely and were 
depending on their husbands for a living. They had taken up volunteer work to keep themselves 
occupied, because they were unable to find any paid jobs. One of them also explained that she went 
abroad when she finished her studies because of the lack of job opportunities for her in Egypt, and 
when she came back she decided not to take up any formal work. 
Education 
Foreigners are not allowed to enter public schools in Egypt. Exceptions can be made, but then they 
have to pay school fees. And even in private schools, foreigners have to pay much more school fees 
than Egyptian nationals. 
"My colleges used to pay 40 pounds, I paid 150 sometimes 200, in that range. But they 
paid 30 or 40 or something like that, so the gap is wide."(Interview Cairo 2009) 
”After that (primary school) I entered preparatory school. It was a governmental school, 
but they didn't accept me, because I'm a Palestinian." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
The second quote illustrates something that was quite common among my interviewees. The girl in 
the story was first accepted into the school, because the administration did not know that she was a 
Palestinian, but when they found out, they asked her to find another school. Stories like this were 
quite common among my interviewees, because they are so similar to Egyptians in every way. It is 
just their papers that make them different, and because of this it is first when they show their papers 
or other signs that they are Palestinian, that they are refused admission. This serves to underline the 
fact that their Palestinian nationality is what keeps them on the outside and that without it they 
would have been accepted to a much higher degree. 
 The high school fees are a big problem for many of the Palestinian families with a low 
income. There are regulations that allow some Palestinians to pay less school fees and the 
Palestinian embassy sometimes help poorer families pay their school fees, but education is still too 
expensive for many and some has to wait too long for help. A father told me about the problems his 
family have had with the school fees. He told me that since his children's mother has Egyptian 
citizenship, they only have to pay 10% of the foreigner’s school fees, but they still pay ten times as 
much as Egyptians. Just to pay for the education of the family’s children has cost them more than 
£E 35000, approximately two times the families total income for one year. Now this is a problem 
for one of his daughters. She wishes to take a masters degree, but they cannot afford the school fees. 
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He has applied to the embassy to help him pay, but this takes a long time. Her semester started 
several months before I met the family, but because they had not paid the school fees, she could not 
go to class (Interview Cairo 2009). 
 Another interviewee tried to take an English course beside her work, but she found that 
foreigners had to pay in US$ or British pounds, so she ended up not taking the course, but tried to 
learn by herself instead. Because the government want an inflow of US$ and British pounds, they 
try to make foreigners pay for things in these currencies whenever they can. But these currencies 
are not readily available for poor Palestinians, so this is another source of problems for many 
families (Interview Cairo 2009). 
 Higher school fees is not the only problem Palestinians can face in their education: 
"When I finished school, I tried to go to the sports college. It was my dream, and I was 
playing basketball. I went there and took all exams, and I passed. They thought I was 
Egyptian, because I look like them, but in the end, they said: "Oh, you are Palestinian, 
you will have to wait for the next year." And I had two choices, either I had to go to 
another school or I had to wait for the next year, so I chose the other school, because of 
the waiting." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
This is another example of a Palestinian that was accepted into school as an Egyptian, but was 
denied entry when the administration found out that she was Palestinian. In this case it ruined her 
dream of being able to have an occupation she liked, and today she is working in a job she does not 
like very much. 
 As illustrated by the many examples above, Palestinians are experiencing different kinds of 
marginalization in many areas of their daily life. And this marginalization is specifically connected 
to their Palestinian identity and does not appear as long as they are not identified as Palestinians. 
The moment they show their Palestinian identity they are marked as different, and not belonging in 
Egypt. In the words of Kagan (2007, p.6) they are “...deliberately blocked from integration in host 
countries in order to serve a political agenda”. 
 As earlier discussed, notions of home-country and host-country are important elements in 
the nationalist discourse. As long as Palestine is represented as the home-country and Egypt as the 
host-country this will have big impacts lives of Palestinians in Egypt. This representation constructs 
Palestinians as guests in Egypt, and because they are guests they have to behave like guests and be 
treated like guests. The idea behind this metaphor is that when they had nowhere else to go Egypt 
accepted them as her guests. And as guests they should either be grateful to their host or leave. They 
cannot enjoy the same rights as Egyptians, because the Egyptian people are already struggling, and 
the government have to take care of their own people first. They are nice with their guests and 
always try to help them, but as guests they have to come second to the Egyptian people. This 
metaphor is very important to the Egyptian government, because the subject positions it constructs 
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for the government and the Palestinians put the government in a very beneficial position. According 
to this metaphor they are the good hosts, and this is important for them. Because the Palestinian 
cause has a lot of support among the Egyptian people it is important for the government to portray 
themselves as friendly to the Palestinians as possible (Interviews and observation Cairo 2009). 
At the same time, the Palestinian cause is a very sensitive cause that has the potential to 
create a popular uprising against the government. Egypt can be seen as a bomb waiting to go off 
because of the decreasing circumstances for a majority of the population. Unemployment and 
poverty is increasing, and the salaries off unskilled workers are losing their worth. At the same time 
the government has gone from the widely popular government of Gamal Abd ElNasser, who also 
had in it a promise off democracy, to the widely unpopular government of Mubarak, who is 
suspected to lay the grounds for his son to follow him as president
3
. Violence and big 
demonstrations are uncommon in today's Egypt, and many Egyptians view their own security as a 
good reason for things to stay as they are. But the frustration with the government is growing, and 
the Palestinian cause is a cause who could potentially build on this frustration and grow into a mass 
uproar against the government. Palestinian issues have caused some of the biggest demonstration in 
newer Egyptian history, and such demonstrations have always been met with severe violence from 
the police (Interviews Cairo 2009, news articles
4
). Another example that the Palestinian cause is 
seen by a sensitive cause became evident for me when I was looking for literature on Palestinians in 
Egypt. I was told that the American University in Cairo does not have any researchers working with 
Palestinians in Egypt, because the last research they facilitated on this field was abolished by the 
government half way through, and the researcher was subsequently denied entrance to Egypt
5
 
 
My interviewees were very unwilling to speak their opinions of the Egyptian state directly, yet the 
picture of the state that they painted through their stories is clear. The Egyptian state is seen as a 
merciless state, a cold machine with no compassion for human feelings. This is illustrated through 
the story of the old man in prison. The government does not take his lack of options into 
consideration, neither do they care about his old age, they judge him for a crime he committed, 
without asking themselves whether the laws are reasonable or whether he had any chance to follow 
                                                 
3  http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5529166/ read on the 28
th
 of August 2010 
4  http://www.presstv.ir/detail/120912.html read on the 28th of August 2010 
 http://palestinenote.com/cs/blogs/news/archive/2010/06/13/egypt-cracks-down-on-anti-police-brutality-
protests.aspx read on the 28th of August 2010 
5  Conversation with Sara Sadek, outreach program coordinator for the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies at 
the American University in Cairo. 
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them. The histories of the families that are struggling to pay their children's school fees and the 
people that cannot get enough work to provide for themselves because of the government's 
regulation also tell about the same. A state that follows a bigger political scheme with no 
considerations for the people that are stuck in the middle. 
In terms of citizenship, residency, employment and education the Palestinians in Egypt are 
clearly constructed as outsiders. They are subjected to the same rules as all foreigners, and in the 
case of Palestinians with Egyptian mothers applying for citizenship, their applications are treated 
even stricter than the applications of people with other nationalities. They are clearly constructed as 
a group that does not belong in Egypt, and the emphasis on returning to Palestine is clear. 
Palestine and the dream of return 
Many Palestinians that went to Egypt as a result of the conflicts were hardly able to take with the 
anything when leaving. The ones who left as refugees were moving in a big hurry, and could only 
bring what they could carry immediately. Assets such as farm land, social networks, knowledge of 
the area and so on could not be transferred, and so all of these assets were lost when the family 
moved. For some this meant that they had to start their new lives with very small means, and for 
them, Palestine represents not only  their "home-land", but much more importantly, it represents all 
their material and social assets. And even though these assets would not be returned to them 
automatically if they return to Palestine, the dream of return is still representing a dream of getting 
back what they lost. In addition the fact that they lost so much when they left the land is proving 
that the land was important to them and thus that they are in need of it (Interviews Cairo 2009). 
 Those who left Palestine during the war of 1948 were expecting their leaves to be short. 
They were told that the Arab armies would come in and take their lands back within short time, and 
that they just had to get out of the way for a small period. Many of the families kept the keys to 
their houses, and hoped to return soon: 
"My grandmother still has the key to her house. She dreamed that one day she will return, 
and she kept the furniture to the house." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
The Arab armies did not win the war, and those who left were never able to come back to what 
became Israeli territory. They are not unable to return because they are in danger at their places of 
origin, but because the new government has decided as a matter of policy to forbid their return. 
They are not Jewish, and because of that they are not wanted by the Israeli government that aims to 
build and maintain a Jewish state (Kagan 2007). 
 Following the end of the 1948-war, the Israeli authorities immediately sought to normalize 
the displacement of the Palestinian refugees through expropriation of their lands. Land was vitally 
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important for the Zionist ambitions in Mandate Palestine, and it continued to be important in Israel 
after the war. It was the physical basis of new settlements and the territorial basis of the new state. 
In the mandate period this happened through purchase on the open marked by the Jewish National 
Fund (JNF), but immediately following the war, only about 13,5% of the Israeli territories were 
under Jewish or state ownership. At the same time the Arab population had diminished from about 
850000 to about 160000 as a result of the war, while Jewish immigration was surging. The lack of 
Jewish land ownership was seen as a problematic by the new Israeli leadership. Palestinian refugee 
land was seen as vital for securing state interests, and, through the use of new legislations, the 
leadership strove to gain possession and ownership of as much of the new territories as possible 
(Forman & Kedar 2003). 
 The estimates of how much land Palestinians lost due to the war is highly inaccurate and 
contested, but it is clear that they lost millions of dunams of land, and that most of the land was 
acquired by Israel through force. After the war, Haganah took to securing the lands and soon started 
cultivating them, and in June 1948 the first Arab lands were allocated to Jews for cultivation. 
Normalization of the seizure started almost immediately, through reclassification of the land as 
abandoned and later "absentee land". These properties then came under state administration, and in 
1960 they were finally reclassified as "Israel land". This is land that is owned by the Israeli people. 
It can never be sold, but it can be leased out for shorter or longer periods. In theory parts of the land 
can be leased to all Israeli citizen, but in practice, almost all the land is leased to Jews (Forman & 
Kedar 2003). 
 The reclassification of the land as abandoned property and later "absentee land" were 
important steps in shaping the discourse around these lands. The new labels did not entail any 
notion of who the owners of the land were, or why they were absent. It simply stated that the owner 
was absent, and as such had no claims to the land. By mentioning the previous owners of the land as 
little as possible, and classifying them as absentees, the Israeli authorities effectively normalized 
their displacement and dispossession. My interviewees were clearly upset by this. One of them told 
me about her grandmother that left as a refugee in 1948: 
"She visited the house five years ago, and it was a Jewish family who lived there. They 
expropriated the house without even informing my family, so the house is still there." 
(Interview Cairo 2009) 
 At one side it was good to see that the family’s house was still intact, but at the same time, 
experiencing the dispossession personally made it more real to her. The family must have known 
that the house would be occupied by someone else, but seeing it themselves made it come true in a 
different way. By telling me this story, my interviewee also wanted to make it clear how unfair the 
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situation was to them. They had never sold the house, or even been informed that anyone else had 
taken it over, they had simply been absent from it because they had no way of returning, and now 
they were treated as if they had left the house without caring about what would happen to it. 
Many of the people who left Palestine later also believed their absence would be short. The most 
extreme story I heard was that of a girl who left with her mother to Egypt from Gaza in order to 
visit her father. This was in 1970, and they were only supposed to stay in Egypt for their holiday, 
but during their stay the political situation changed and they were unable to go back. Today the girl 
is a grown up woman, and she is still staying in Egypt. She has visited Gaza several times, but she 
has not been able to go back and live in Gaza, even though she has tried. Her mother died still 
waiting to go back (Interviews Cairo 2009). 
 This is yet another story of people that did not want to leave their land, but was forced to do 
so. This time they did not leave as refugees, but was denied the right to come back after a short visit 
in Egypt. This was a very important point for this woman to stress, and she also stressed that she 
had tried returning to Gaza several times, but the circumstances has made it impossible for her to 
stay there permanently. 
 
The dream of return was something all of my interviewees had in common. Not all of them wanted 
to return to Palestine permanently and live their lives there, but all of my interviewees shared the 
longing to be able to go freely to Palestine, either to stay there permanently, or just for visits. It was 
common to claim that “Everybody dreams to go back”, especially among elder people with more 
assets. For them the dream of return was seen almost as an inevitable part of being Palestinian. 
According to Peteet (2007) the past represent what have been denied to the Palestinian refugees, a 
safe location, recognition of their rights, a sense of belonging in one’s own homeland and a process 
of justice. The dream of return is not only a dream of returning to the land, but a dream of getting 
back what was lost. 
Some of the younger people did not share the elders wish to live in Palestine, they told me 
that they wanted to visit Palestine, but they have their lives in Egypt. They grew up in Egypt, they 
have their friends and their work in Egypt, and they do not have those things in Palestine. In 
addition they are more similar to Egyptians in many ways, they speak the Egyptian language, and 
they have grown up in an Egyptian environment.  Yet they shared the dream of return, not as an 
actual wish of going back, but as an obligation they shared as members of the community. It was an 
obligation to fight for their rights, that they had to fulfil to be accepted as true Palestinians. 
Being Palestinian is a master signifier that obtains specific meanings within specific 
discourses. Within the prevalent discourses of the PLO-institutions all Palestinians dream of return 
to Palestine, so in order for people to qualify as Palestinians within that discourse, they have to 
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share the dream. The PLO-institutions are important institutions within my case, and their power 
stretched far in terms of defining “the true Palestinian” within the community. By entering the PLO-
institutions, the Palestinians have to relate to their discourse, thus supporting the discourse, by 
acting in compliance with it. For some the dream of return was a dream they had to support in order 
to fit into the definition of a “true Palestinian” within the PLO-discourse, but that did not play an 
important part in their lives outside of the institutions. 
 
The representatives of the PLO-institutions did not mention where in Palestine they wanted people 
to return to, and they did not emphasize if people should return to their original lands, or if they 
could return to any place in Palestine. Yet, for several of the other people I spoke with this was a 
very important question: 
"…… it became equal for them, Cairo to a city in the West Bank or Gaza. They were not 
going to return, except for to Jaffa."  (Interview Cairo 2009) 
"We are from Ramla. And Ramla is now in Israel. You know 48. Now I am staying in 
Egypt and my cousins are in Palestine, they are not in Ramla. They are in Gaza. And if I 
return, I will not return to Gaza, it’s not my country anyway, so either way I’m not living 
in my country, you understand? If I return I will return to Ramla."(Interview Cairo 2009) 
"Gaza is beautiful, but it's not my country." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
These statements all emphasize that it is not as much about returning to Palestine, as about returning 
to where their families originally came from. It was very important to these people that I understood 
that, because the attempts at creating lasting peace agreements between Palestine and Israel have 
never treated this issue. The only provision that have been made for people to return allowed them 
to return to Gaza or the West Bank and this was not considered enough. These people were not 
interested in going to Gaza or the West Bank, because they had nothing to go to in these places. Any 
real opportunity for them to settle in Gaza or the West Bank, might even be seen as a threat against 
their livelihood, because it might be used by the Egyptian government to stop them from staying in 
Egypt. A return to the families original lands also encompassed an idea that they would be 
compensated for what they lost when they left the land, and the ideal would be that they would get 
back the same houses and the same farmlands that their family were owning before they left. 
Primarily then, the emphasis on returning to the families original land can be seen as an emphasis 
that they will not return unless they actually have something to return to, thus ensuring that they 
will not leave what they have in Egypt without knowing what they will get in Palestine. Secondly it 
can also be seen as a way of explaining why they are staying in Egypt without attempting to move 
to Palestine, at the same time as they claim that they are dreaming about living in Palestine. Many 
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interviewees emphasized that they would live in Palestine “if the conditions where good”, thus 
explaining why they had not gone there already. Ever since 1948 it has been impossible for any 
Palestinians that left the new Israeli territories to go back to live there, and by emphasizing that they 
want to live in these places, they at the same time explain why they are still staying in Egypt. This is 
also emphasized by Peteet (2007), who claims that the right to return does not mean that the 
Palestinians would actually return if given the possibility. Their return depends on economic and 
other relations, as well as relations to the host-country. 
 
For those who did not want to live in Palestine, visiting Palestine was an important goal, and for 
those who had been there, they saw the visits as major events in their lives. A young woman told me 
that she went to Palestine once when she was 6 years old, and I asked her if she remembered 
anything from it. She answered: " – Of course. I remember more from that period than I remember 
from the whole of my childhood" (Interview Cairo 2009). Several other people told me that when 
they were visiting they felt at home there, and they did not want to leave again: 
"I was a child, the first time I went there I was 10 years old, and time second time I was 
around twelve. Even when I moved around in Nablus, the old city, I had a feeling, like I 
want to run in the streets, all over the place, and the mountains was really amazing, like 
green mountains, we don't have that here. So everything was like, I didn't want to leave. It 
was different, the place." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
"...when I was there, I felt that when they knew that this Palestinian group is coming from 
Egypt, that they treat us differently, they let us get to know the country more than the 
others. If it was any other visitor, they could welcome him, but in addition to welcoming 
us they let us get to know the country, as if they’re telling us this place is yours, you’re 
one of us." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
The places they were visiting were seen as more “homely” than they places where they live in 
Egypt. Because they have been hearing that they are guests in Egypt all their lives, it became a good 
experience for them to come to Palestine and hear that they were at home. It became easier to come 
to terms with the fact that people treat them like guests in Egypt, by experiencing that people were 
treating them as if they were at home somewhere else. 
In the nationalist discourse, the belonging in the national homeland is seen as something 
natural. Just as a tree belongs in the soil where it first grew, people belong in their national 
homelands. If they move they will suffer from a lack of roots in their new land, and to the people I 
spoke with, Palestine represents a homeland where they can find those roots again.  
Connections to the Palestine of today 
Many Palestinians in Egypt still have family in Palestine, and those who had been there were very 
excited about meeting their families. Some had not seen close relatives in many years, and for 
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others it was their first time to meet some of their family members: 
“All the people came to my uncle’s house to see me and to see my father after 25 years” 
(Interview Cairo 2009). 
A woman whose family are originally from the West Bank told me about when she was visiting a 
village in the West Bank, and she was walking in the streets with her son and daughter. From far 
away she saw a woman with a Palestinian dress, and she said that this is a real Palestinian lady, 
walking very straight and very nice. When they came closer to each other she looked at her face, 
and saw that it was similar to her own, and she said: "You are my aunt." The woman asked her about 
her name, and confirmed that she was her aunt. Another time, at a conference they were attending, a 
man was asking for her, and she thought it was something about her being with the union. But the 
man recognized her name, and he said he was her cousin. She had not seen him before, but because 
of the name he knew that she was his cousin, and he was walking with her the rest of the time she 
stayed in that place (Interview Cairo 2009). 
 For these people, the question of whether or not the Palestinians should be allowed to return 
to Palestine is not only about nationality, it is about fulfilling a dream of justice, getting back 
previously owned assets and about having the possibility to live close to friends and relatives. 
 When it comes to visiting Palestine, this is also an issue. For these people, visiting Palestine 
is not about some abstract ideas about visiting their homeland. It is about visiting actual friends and 
relatives. In other words, they are not going to Palestine exclusively to visit the Palestinian nation, 
see the Palestinian cultural traditions, experience the Palestinian society or anything like that. These 
things are important for many, and they might be reasons to visit Palestine, but the strongest reason 
why people want to visit Palestine is more often because they want to visit family and friends living 
in the Palestinian territories.  
 
It is everything but easy for Palestinians in Egypt to visit relatives in Palestine. Visiting the West 
Bank is possible, but only with a visa from the Israeli authorities. The procedures are complicated 
and obtaining a visa is very difficult. This is often regarded as deeply unfair: 
"Visa is a big problem. Everybody from outside West Bank are allowed to visit Palestine. 
Anyone from another nationality can visit, but not us." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
A volunteer in the GUPWom with relatives in the West Bank told me that none of her sisters and 
brothers had been able to go to the West Bank. She had only been able to go herself because she 
went on the behalf of the GUPWom and a representative for the Palestinian Authorities fixed the 
visa for her (Interview Cairo 2009). 
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 For Palestinians to enter Gaza a visitors permit from the Israeli government that can only be 
obtained through an invitation from a family member is a necessary prerequisite. An interviewee 
that had been there a number of times visiting his family, told me that the possibility to enter was 
arbitrary and dependent on personal relations. He once had a fight with an officer, and as a 
consequence he was denied entry for almost 10 year, thus missing his sister’s funeral. Since the 
Gaza-blockade following Hamas take over in Gaza visiting has become very difficult. My 
interviewee had tried getting a visitors permit several times, but he had not succeeded (Interview 
Cairo 2009). Again, the actions of the Palestinians in Egypt are tightly regulated by events far out of 
their own control and the rules that limit their actions are often implemented arbitrarily and on the 
basis of personal relations. 
 To enter any parts of Palestine, a visa from the Israeli government is required, but not 
everybody is willing to apply to the Israeli government to visit their own country. The possibilities 
for entering has also been severely restricted since the second intifada, and several people that had 
been visiting before the intifada reported that it was impossible for them to go there now 
(Interviews Cairo 2009). 
 The uncertainty and conflict in the Palestinian areas make visiting even more difficult. For 
example a person might spend a lot of time and efforts gaining a visitors or residence permit, only 
to be unable to go because of new conflicts. And even worse is the uncertainty about what is 
happening with friends and relatives (Interviews Cairo 2009). 
 One of the questions I asked all my interviewees was how the Palestinians-Israeli conflict is 
affecting their own life, and almost all of them answered that it had a huge effect on them, because 
they were frightened about what might happen with friends and relatives. One of them explained it 
like this: 
"The kids’ uncles are living there, and one of them had his house demolished, and one of 
them was injured. Sometimes people have heart attacks, but they can't come to Egypt, and 
they can't go to the West Bank to be cured, and one of our relatives died because of this. 
We are always shattered by the news." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
The focus on the news was very important for many, they are "dealing with news like water and 
air" and "If you find any news about Palestine, it catches your attention automatically”. A young 
man told me that he used to watch the news instead of watching movies, and when other youths 
were going to the internet to chat with their friends, he would go to forums to talk about the conflict 
(Interviews Cairo 2009). 
 This focus on what is happening in Palestine can be interpreted as a result of looking at the 
nation as an imagined community, where it becomes necessary to feel empathy with everybody 
within the community. In this way what happens to the other members of the community becomes 
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very important, because if the circumstances were different it could just as well have happened to 
themselves. Yet my interviewees expressed the care for their friends and family as the main reasons 
why they worried so much about what happened in Palestine. The differences between these two 
ways of interpreting the situation is very important, and this can be illustrated by an example from a 
young Palestinian that did not have as many personal ties to people in Palestine. He told me that for 
a certain period he had been very upset every time he heard some bad news about Palestine. 
Because of his feelings for the country and the Palestinian people, the news about Palestine seemed 
to touch him much deeper than the news from other places. But because of the continued violence 
in Palestine, and the never ending stream of bad news, he had to stop thinking like this, and in the 
end he did not want to watch news about Palestine any more (Interview Cairo 2009). 
 His story stands in sharp contrast to the stories of the people that always wanted to watch the 
news and know what was going on. These people were looking for news about their own friends 
and relatives, and every time they learned that the violence had been in a different area from where 
their connections lived, or in other ways knew that they were not involved, they were able to relax 
and not let the news reach them on a personal level. 
 
Palestine represents many things to the Palestinians in Egypt, and although the representation of 
Palestine is probably the most important, it is not the only one. It is also a place where family and 
friends are living, that can be visited. It is important to know what is going on in Palestine, not only 
because it is the home-land, but because what happens there happens to friends and family. It is also 
important because it has the possibility to impact their own lives directly, as it has done so many 
times before.  
 The representation of Palestine as a home-land obtains much of its important through being 
a central element in the Palestinian fight for justice. The loss of the home-land represents the loss of 
personal assets, legal rights and justice, and the dream of return is also a dream of getting back 
those assets. 
 
ElAbed (2009) claims that for some Palestinians in Egypt, Palestine does not  represents much more 
than a force that is keeping them from full integration in Egypt. In my case this representation of 
Palestine is existing, but in a very ambivalent form. This is because I have chosen interviewees that 
have chosen a focus on the positive effects of Palestine in their lives, and thus it cannot be 
represented as a totally negative force. They have experienced that a specific interpretation of 
Palestine has a negative impact on their lives, yet they still believe that another interpretation can 
have positive effects. Their experiences are clearly affected by the decisions of both the Egyptian 
and Israeli authorities, as they have to live with the consequences of these decisions every day. And 
79 
 
these decisions are not determined by concerns for the well-being of Palestinians in Egypt, but can 
be better understood as the result of a long-lasting ideological conflict where the discourse of 
“belonging as nationality” plays a leading role. The experiences of my interviewees show that the 
discourse of “belonging as nationality” has been used, in whatever way it was found beneficial by 
the sitting governments of Egypt and Israel, to both describe relationship of Palestinians to Egypt 
and Palestine, and to determine their rights in those countries. In the next chapter I will explore 
further the impact this has on my interviewees and how they react to it through active use and 
rejection of the discourse of “belonging as nationality” 
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Chapter 6: 
Living in between and the struggle for 
belonging 
The metaphors of home-country and host-country are important in constructing a Palestinian 
identity in Egypt. They are important both because the policies of the Egyptian and Israeli 
authorities make them important, and because the PLO-organisations put so much emphasis on 
returning to the home-country. This is affecting the lives of Palestinians in Egypt through the 
policies of the Israeli and Egyptian government. These policies are regulating what they can and 
cannot do to a very large extent and this has grave impact on their lives. The biggest consequences, 
however, are only visible when looking at the combined effects of Egyptian and Israeli laws. As I 
have argued in the previous chapter these laws are drawing on the discourse of “belonging as 
nationality”, and in this chapter I will discuss the following question: 
 How are my interviewees experiencing and reacting to “belonging as nationality” in their 
daily lives? 
The discourse of “belonging as nationality” and the metaphors of home-land and host-country are 
forced on my interviewees from above through the laws that govern their lives, but my interviewees 
have also taken an active stand themselves, by using the discourse actively at certain times and 
discarding it at other times. Outwardly they accept and embrace the discourse, they have all joined 
their respective organizations because the discourse of the organizations have a certain appeal to 
them. To a some extent it can help them understand their experiences and go on with their lives, but 
for the explanations they can find within the discourse are sometimes omitting important issues in 
their lives. Problems that are limited to the poorer classes are not important issues within the 
discourse, they are disregarded with statements such as “the government is doing its best to help”, 
or the embassy or the other PLO-institutions (Interviews Cairo 2009). Because of this, most of my 
interviewees were only accepting parts of the discourse, and they were looking for answers and 
actions outside of the “belonging as nationality” discourse whenever that made more sense to them. 
Although they accepted the discourse within certain forums, they rejected it and even opposed it in 
other forums. 
This chapter will open with a discussion on the difficulties of being stateless. This creates 
major formal problems for those who suffer from it, and it can also create a profound sense of lack 
of belonging. I will begin by addressing the formal problems of being stateless, and after that go on 
to address the lack of belonging that this creates. My interviewees are reacting differently to this. A 
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major strategy is to create stronger bonds to Palestine in order to cope with the lack of belonging to 
Egypt. This strategy is clearly utilizing the discourse of "belonging as nationality", and I will 
discuss both positive and negative effects from it. In the end of the chapter I will discuss a few 
alternative strategies for coping with the lack of belonging, that both utilizes the discourse of 
"belonging as nationality" and rejects or oppose it. 
Being stateless 
Citizenship gives certain rights to the holders, for example the right to live in a states territory, the 
right to work in the state, and inclusion in the state’s well fare system. Being stateless means not 
enjoying these rights. 
 There are 5 types of documents for stateless Palestinians. The first is for people who are 
residing in the West Bank and in Gaza. The second is an Egyptian document for people that left 
Gaza after 1967. The third is for those who went to Jordan, they have two year documents from the 
Jordanian authorities. The fourth is for those ones who went to Lebanon, and the fifth those who 
went to Syria (Interview Cairo 2009). 
 Most of my interviewees hold Egyptian travel documents, and some hold both Egyptian 
travel documents and other papers. The travel documents look much like Egyptian passports, but 
they clearly states that the holders are Palestinian, and they do not give the same rights as Egyptian 
passports. As the name implies it is an ID document used as a passport when travelling and for other 
purposes where a passport is needed, but it does not entail Egyptian citizenship. The Egyptian 
document does not give the holder the right to live and work in Egypt, and the holder is not 
included in the Egyptian well fare system. The holder has to apply separately to be able to live and 
work in the country, and have to pay extra fees to enjoy public services, like education. In addition 
the holder of an Egyptian travel document is not automatically allowed entry to Egypt (ElAbed 
2009, Interviews Cairo 2009). 
 If the holder of an Egyptian travel document leaves Egypt for more than 6 months, he loses 
the residence permit and cannot come back. If he wants to be staying out of Egypt for more than 6 
months he has to apply to get a special permit, and even then he has to return to Egypt within a year. 
This makes it hard to work in the Gulf for example, because if someone goes to the Gulf to work, 
when his contract ends and he is supposed to go back, Egypt will not allow him to enter. Because of 
this the companies prefer to employ workers with other documents who do not have this problem. It 
is also a big problem for people that left Gaza in 1967 and went to other countries than Egypt. Most 
of them have Egyptian documents, but they cannot come to Egypt now, and some people have been 
staying at airports for many months because no country would allow them to enter (ElAbed 2009, 
Interviews Cairo 2009). In the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 this got severe consequences for the 
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Palestinian holders of Egyptian travel documents that were residing in Iraq. Following the allied 
victory over Iraq, thousands of Palestinians were either expelled from the Gulf States or left on their 
own. As a result, about 30 000 Palestinians stranded in Kuwait and were not accepted as residents 
by any state. Most of them were people with Egyptian documents. In 1995 something slightly 
similar happened to Palestinians residing in Libya, when the Libyan leader Muammar AlQadhafi 
made a political statement that Palestinians should return to Palestine by expelling about 1000 
Palestinians with Egyptian travel documents and leaving them on the Egyptian-Libyan border. 
Some of them were able to enter Egypt or other countries, but several hundreds remained stranded 
at the border for two years, until Qadhafi allowed them to re-enter Libya (ElAbed 2009).  
 Another problem of being stateless is that of travelling. To cross international borders one 
needs a valid passport that grants access to the country one is entering. But the Egyptian travel 
document grants access to very few countries and applying for a visa can be a difficult process. A 
young Palestinian woman told me that in order to obtain a visa, she first has to get a document from 
the Israeli government, and then she  has to go back to Cairo to apply for the Visa. The only 
exceptions are a few Middle Eastern countries where she can go without a visa, but even there, 
there are problems: 
"When we were trying to travel to Algeria the first time (....) They checked the papers, 
and they said it was ok, you will travel, your passport is ok. But when they saw that we 
had a transit through France, they made all of us go back. They took the ticket from us. I 
mean, they checked in our luggage and everything, but when they saw that we had a 
transit through France, they said that we couldn't go." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
Even when staying in Egypt lacking Egyptian citizenship can cause problems moving about and 
fulfilling everyday tasks. According to Egyptian law everybody has to carry their personal 
identification when going out. For this purpose every Egyptian citizen over 18 years of age have an 
official ID-card, but those ID-cards are only given out to citizens. Non-citizens have to carry other 
forms of identification, usually their passports. As an interviewee explained this can easily cause 
problems: 
"...it's very difficult to go out with your passport, because if you lose it you will spend a 
lot of money, and a lot of time to obtain a new." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
When travelling around Egypt, and especially in the Sinai, it is necessary to pass a lot of 
checkpoints where foreigners are required to show their passports. This can potentially cause 
problems for Palestinian people, because as a group, they are seen as a security risk by the Egyptian 
state. For a young man travelling through the Sinai his passport caused him to be detained by the 
police for several hours, because when they saw that he was Palestinian, they wanted to check him 
out much more thoroughly than what is usual. This was a person that was dependent on travelling a 
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lot to obtain work, but he told me he has almost given up travelling around Egypt because it causes 
him so many problems. 
 All in all the Egyptian travel documents does not give the holders the right to be treated as 
Egyptian nationals, and even though it is an ID document in line with a passport, it does not give 
any of the rights following from a citizenship. In some cases it even draws suspicion to the holders, 
because it points them out as members of a group which is considered a security risk. 
Living in between. 
Apart from the formal effects of being stateless, like not having the rights of citizenship, and 
difficulties with travel, being stateless also have psychological effects. Many interviewees used 
their nationality to understand their feelings of not belonging. For example a young man told me 
that he had been called in to do army service, but he was afraid that his Palestinian background 
might cause him problems. 
"Because I entered Palestine, there is some reasons or security rules that I can't enter the 
army, just because I entered Palestine. And my mother is a Palestinian, even if I'm not. If 
my mother wasn't a Palestinian, maybe they would say ok, we can take him, but 
especially Palestinians, they don't take them." 
According to this man everybody who has entered Palestine is seen by the government as posing a 
security risk, and because of this he should not enter the military. This rule is not always followed, 
but because his mother is Palestinian that should also exclude him from the military. Because of this 
he is very surprised that they have called him in to join the army. At the time of my fieldwork, he 
did not enter the army yet, but he was afraid of what might happen when he enters and they realize 
that he is Palestinian. He was convinced that his Palestinians background made him different from 
the other recruits and singled him out as a security risk. 
 Because of the hegemonic status of the “belonging as nationality” discourse when 
discussing the rights of Palestinians in Egypt, many of my interviewees felt that they did not belong 
there.  An Arabic term much used to describe this feeling is Ghurba. The word Ghurba means exile 
or being away from the homeland, being a stranger separated from ones familiar home or being a 
foreigner. It is commonly used to refer to all Palestinians living outside of Palestine, and has often 
been translated to mean diaspora. 
 Diaspora is a very wide term that refers to people from one place of origin, or a home-land, 
that are scattered across several places, yet they retain an identity and community tied to the home-
land. The term is very wide, and somewhat diffuse, and have been said to carry the risk of being 
“semantically overloaded”. Diasporas can be caused by voluntary or forced mass-movements, but 
not all mass-movements are diasporas, and it can be difficult to determine if a migrant community 
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can be determined as a diasporic community or not. In the case of the Palestinian population, they 
have some characteristics that qualify them as a diaspora and some that disqualifies them, but the 
fact remains that to live outside of one’s home-land is important for identity formation, and the term 
diaspora might be useful to understand this process. It can be seen as a way of being in the world 
where places of origin become utmost important, and it can also create a sense of romantization of 
living beyond the nation-state or at unease in the host state (Peteet 2007).  
 To be a foreigner was an integral part of the Palestinian identity formation, and one of my 
interviewees told me how she felt about living as a foreigner: 
"All our life we lived as foreigners. We sang an anthem that was not the anthem of our 
nation, we saluted a flag that was not the flag of our nation. And this was very difficult. 
The one who is living in a country, without making it normal, he has problems." 
(Interview Cairo 2009) 
She describes how she has to salute the Egyptian flag, even though she is not seen as an Egyptian, 
neither by herself or by other, and that as long as she cannot adjust to become an Egyptian, she will 
always have problems, feeling like a stranger.  
One of the results of such lack of belonging is uncertainty about the future, are they going to 
live in Egypt or Palestine or another country? This uncertainty again creates an unsafe environment, 
where investments in the future are risky, because one might be forced to move and lose everything 
one have built up (Interview Cairo 2009). This feeling of lack of belonging can be psychologically 
difficult. One of my interviewees used the term “no-lander” to describe herself and her feeling of 
not belonging, neither in Egypt, nor Palestine. 
Being a “no-lander” is usually manifested through individual feelings. Yet, as all feelings, 
they are results of real experiences. In this case the results of the experiences are difficult to express 
because the experiences are many and diverse. They are not leading towards specific knowledge, 
but rather towards general feelings that are difficult to express. This is illustrated in the following 
story about a young musician. He was once participating in an international competition, and he 
was about to be entered into the finals. When the managers found out that he was stateless, they 
decided that he could not participate in the finals because all the finalists had to represent their own 
country, and being stateless he could not do that. This left him feeling that he was somehow a lesser 
person than the other participants, because he lacked a quality that was obviously important in the 
competition. Such a feeling of inferiority was common among my interviewees, and it was often 
accompanied by a feeling of being subjected to unfair treatment. Their lack of a clear defined 
belonging as a result of their ambiguous nationality was something totally out of their control, yet 
they were judged by it every day. 
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The most common way of dealing with the lack of belonging following from the ambiguous 
nationality was to make a clear divide between nationality and citizenship. Even when using the 
same word, nationality, to describe both, it was clear that my interviewees assigned different 
meanings to it according to whether it should be interpreted as what I have defined as nationality or 
citizenship. They wished for recognition of their continued residency in Egypt, and Egyptian 
citizenship was seen as such a recognition. It would give them rights and justify their residence in 
Egypt, but according to them it would not alter their Palestinian nationality. Their nationality was 
connected with their feelings for Palestine, and those would not be altered by giving them rights in 
Egypt. Only a very small minority of my interviewees had Palestinian citizenship, yet they all 
defined themselves as Palestinians, whether they had Jordanian citizenship, Egyptian citizenship or 
no citizenship at all. At one level the wish for Egyptian citizenship breaks completely with the 
discourse of “belonging as nationality”. They claim that their nationality is Palestinian, yet they 
wish for citizenship as a means of recognition of their belonging in Egypt as a matter of their 
prolonged residence there. But at the same time, all of my interviewees had a strong sense that they 
belonged in Palestine because of their Palestinian nationality. In other words, they acknowledge that 
within the discourse of “belonging as nationality” they belong in Palestine, and that in an ideal 
world they would live there, but the discourse does not fit with their reality. The fact is that they live 
in Egypt, and because of that they want to be recognized as belonging in Egypt. 
 The divide between citizenship and nationality is probably most important for those who do 
not have a citizenship. If citizenship equals nationality, that would mean that they do not have a 
nationality either, but by differentiating between citizenship and nationality, they can make it clear 
that they have a nationality, even though they do not have a citizenship. They define themselves as 
Palestinian according to their inheritance and traditions, and in this way they feel that they belong 
somewhere. Because of the strong position of the “belonging as nationality” discourse, their 
nationality becomes very important to give them a sense of belonging. It is very important to learn 
about the Palestinian culture and traditions, because through that one is learning about the place one 
belong, and solidifying one's belonging in that place. The feeling of not belonging in Egypt is also 
most definitely important in pushing this agenda forward, because by feeling that one does not 
belong in one's place of residence, it becomes even more important to feel that one belongs 
somewhere else.  
 Even further along this line, some of my interviewees actively used their Palestinian identity 
as something to be proud of. One of them told me about a game she used to play with her brother, 
where they named famous people, and pretended as if they were Palestinian. In that way, they 
constructed a world where they belonged not only to a specific people, but to a specific people 
which had some great things to be proud of. And while playing this game, they also found out that 
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several of the people they were naming actually had some Palestinian background, thus confirming 
their pride in their people (Interview Cairo 2009).  
 
It was also important for many of my interviewees to gain knowledge about Palestine and 
Palestinian tradition because of the prejudices they could meet when people found out that they 
were Palestinians. One of my interviewees reported that she had been harassed by her fellow 
students when she was in school. They used to tell her that her people sold their land, and she told 
me that the Egyptian history books taught the students this. One way to deal with this that was 
important to several of my interviewees was to gain knowledge about Palestine and their 
background, so that they could counter such stories by telling other stories based on their own 
knowledge (Interviews Cairo 2009). 
The members of the folkloric groups of AlFalluja and Choral Abd El Shams were especially 
committed to learning about Palestinian folklore. Every week each group met in order to sing 
Palestinian songs and dance Palestinian dances, and they were also talking about Palestine, learning 
about their history, and discussing present events. For some of the participants this was part of 
getting to know their past and their roots. One of them described it as "getting closer to my 
grandparents", another one said that when he comes to the choral or Fallujah, he feels as if he has 
found something that he lost. Their Palestinian nationality, and the efforts to maintain the 
Palestinian cultural heritage was also described with words such as “instinct” or “connecting with 
something deep inside of me”(Interviews Cairo 2009). The Palestinian nationality was a master-
signifier for them, and the discourse that represented Palestinian nationality as consisting of folklore 
and traditions were naturalized through the hegemonic position this had gained during the 
Palestinian nation-building. Through this the necessity to remember and retain that culture was seen 
as something natural that followed automatically from their nationality. 
Focusing on their Palestinian identity also made it possible for them to relate to a bigger group of 
people with the same issues as themselves. Because of the scatteredness of the Palestinian 
population in Egypt, for many Palestinians the only other Palestinians they meet are family 
members, or friends of their families, but by being a part of the GUPWom, the PRCS, the Choral 
Abd ElShams or the Fallujah, they meet other people with the same problems as themselves. A 
member of the GUPWom told me that all her life she has been feeling special, different from other 
people in Egypt, but when she found the GUPWom she found other people that were similar to 
herself, and so the union became very important to her (Interview Cairo 2009). 
In short, my interviewees had two main reasons to join, and remain in, the GUPWom, 
Fallujah and Choral Abd ElShams. The first one was because they had an “instinct” that told them 
that as "true Palestinians" they should learn about the Palestinian cultural heritage and folklore. The 
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second reason was because these institutions functioned as gathering-places, where they could meet 
other people in similar situations as themselves. Because of this, the institutions are important assets 
to its users, and as such its leaders have significant power over the users. The leaders have the 
power to define the institutions and their policies, and in many respects to define what makes a 
person a “true Palestinian”. The users of the institutions have to conform to the leaders, at least 
explicitly, in order to keep their status as true Palestinians and be welcomed as members of the 
groups. 
 An important part of being a “true Palestinian” was speaking the Palestinian dialect of 
Arabic. One of the first times I visited in the GUPWom they were having a celebration for the 
Palestinian children that were doing good in school. One of the things they did during the 
celebration was to have a competition for the children to see who knew some different Palestinian 
words. Through this they were aiming to encourage the children to learn the Palestinian dialect. The 
son of a Palestinian woman explained to me how his mother changed her language into the 
Palestinian dialect whenever she was thinking about Palestine. He said it was like "changing the 
radio". He was clearly proud that his mother use the language that much, and told me that he did his 
best to learn it himself (Interview Cairo 2009). 
Even though language was portrayed as an important part of being Palestinians, most of the 
Palestinians that grew up in Egypt do not know the Palestinian dialect very well. An interviewee 
was telling me about his experiences when he met a guy from Palestine and tried to learn the 
Palestinian dialect: 
"At first I wasn’t interested if I was talking Palestinian or not, but after a while, I saw that 
he was talking to me and I found that every time I spend time with him, I find 10 
Palestinian there speaking Palestinian, and I’m supposed to be Palestinian and I don’t 
know how to. I discovered that the Palestinians that I sit with treat me as if I’m Egyptian, 
so I started getting mixed up from inside not knowing whether I’m Egyptian or 
Palestinian. I found that I’m nothing, and it started upsetting me a lot. Little by little I 
started talking to them in a Palestinian dialect, and they started making fun of me, and 
laughing, like it’s not said in this way, it’s supposed to be said like that, what are you 
saying? These things really upset me until I decided at the end not to sit with them 
anymore." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
For this man, his experiences meeting someone "more Palestinian" than him proved difficult, and it 
was the language that was determining for him. He found that since he did not speak the Palestinian 
language, he was not seen as a Palestinian by these men, yet his whole life he had learned that he 
was Palestinian not Egyptian, and in the end he felt like he was neither of them. He told me that: 
"If I talk in front of an Egyptian Palestinian he will say (I speak) Palestinian, but when I 
talk in front of Palestinian Palestinians there are still things of course, this very distinct 
dialect, some parts are missing."(Interview Cairo 2009) 
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This demonstrates that the national identity is not something simple, that you are either inside or 
outside. Rather several types of sub-identities can exist within a nationality, so that within the 
category of Palestinians there is a difference between those growing up in Palestine and those 
growing up in other countries. When trying to reduce a national identity to one heterogeneous 
group, some people are invariably left in between two groups, because they fit in neither of them. 
For those of my interviewees that focused too much on their Palestinian identity, meeting people 
that were more Palestinian than themselves, and at the same time having to face the notion of 
national identity as something that is supposed to be pure, not mixed, made them feel even more 
lost than before (Interviews Cairo 2009). 
 
Another problem rising from the focus of Palestinian nationality was a feeling that Palestinians 
were different, because Palestine is a different nation. Palestine is a nation without a state and thus it 
is different from many other nations. Within a nationalist discourse, all nations should have their 
own states, and a common way to interpret it if a nation does not have a state is that that particular 
nation is a week or bad nation, that does not deserve its own state. The fact that a nation does not 
have a state might even give rise to questions about whether it qualifies as a nation at all. Because 
the Palestinian nation does not have a sovereign state, some of my interviewees where feeling 
slightly inferior as a result of their nationality (Interviewees Cairo 2009). An interpretation that 
could lead to this feeling is that Palestine has “allowed” her territories to be occupied by Israel and 
thus she is a week nation, and all people with Palestinian nationality are week people. Within a 
different discourse the interpretation might be that there is no sovereign Palestinian state because of 
historical circumstances which have very little to do with the Palestinian nation, and even less to do 
with the Palestinians alive today. The second explanation is generally accepted as the most rational 
explanation, yet it still seems that the first explanation has a certain hold over the feelings of some 
of my interviewees. This can also be very negative, because an increased focus on Palestine as a 
different, week or substandard nation, and her people as week people, can lead some people into a 
state off depression that might make their conditions even worse. Take the example of the student 
that said that he could not get a job as a professor because he is Palestinian. This student is not 
working hard in school, because he knows that he will not get that job, so he thinks there is no 
point. As a result of this, he will go out of school with bad grades. If he did not focus on the fact 
that he was Palestinian and could not get the job, the chance that he would get better grades is 
higher. Even though he probably would not get the job, because he still is a Palestinian, most people 
would agree that it is better to go out of school with good grades than with bad grades. But because 
the student focused too much on the limitations laid upon him as a Palestinian, he could not find the 
necessary motivation to work hard with his studies. 
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Another way of dealing with their lack of belonging in Egypt that some of my interviewees 
used in certain occasions was to hide their Palestinian nationality. As earlier discussed the 
marginalisation of the Palestinians arises only when their Palestinian identity become evident, for 
example in situations where IDs are required. As a reaction to this, a young woman said that 
whenever she was going out with her parents, she asked them not to speak the Palestinian dialect. 
She did not want people to know that they are Palestinian, because foreigners pay extra in cabs, to 
enter museums and many similar things (Interview Cairo 2009). In my study this was not very 
prevalent, probably because I have purposely chosen people with strong feelings about their 
Palestinian nationality, but ElAbed (2009) discusses this further in her study which is based on a 
representative sample of the all the Palestinians in Egypt. The fact that I also found tendencies 
towards this in my own study just underlines the importance of such mechanisms.  
Accepting the guest metaphor? 
Egypt has effectively represented itself as a host-country for the Palestinians residing in it, and the 
Palestinians are represented as guests. Throughout their lives, the Palestinians are made to 
understand this, by having to renew their residence permits regularly, having to pay extra school 
fees, and accepting worse jobs because of their nationality. The feelings of not belonging have been 
reinforced by the Palestinian institutions, and their focus on returning to Palestine. The fact that 
these institutions are so important for the creation of a community and a Palestinian identity in 
Egypt, have made most of my interviewees accept their discourse, at least explicitly. During my 
fieldwork, I often heard people say things like:  
"We know that the Egyptians are suffering from the lack of job opportunities here in 
Egypt, and we appreciate what they are doing, so the Egyptian citizens are suffering the 
same." (Interview Cairo 2009) 
 Another interviewee was quick to point out that the situation is worse in many other 
countries: 
"… but when I think of it, I mean a part of these difficulties that we face as Palestinians, 
also Egyptian citizens face it. But I think that we Palestinians that came to Egypt are 
luckier than our counterparts that live in Lebanon for example, because the situation there 
is really horrible. But here we are treated as citizens. If you tell an Egyptian that you are a 
Palestinian you find them welcoming. They are very good people. I think the Egyptian 
government doesn't differ from any other government in the world. In Kuwait and Dubai, 
and any other Arab country, Palestinians are treated the same. They treat us as foreigners, 
and the governments don't sympathize a lot with the issue" (Interview Cairo 2009) 
By accepting a subject position as guests, they are also forced to accept that the Egyptian 
government have to prioritize their own citizens, and appreciate any help they get. They are cut off 
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from all opportunities to complain, because guests do not complain. Guests accept what they get 
and are grateful for that, or they leave. 
 But even though my interviewees hardly volunteered any opinions that where directly in 
conflict with the “belonging of nationality” discourse and hardly made any direct complains against 
the government, the stories they told me illustrated that they had a lot to complain about. They were 
always very carefully in wording any opinions on the government and an interviewee even told me 
that people are not allowed to speak about the government in Egypt. Another interviewee told me 
that there were some things he would say that I could not expect the others to say because of their 
relationships with the PLO-institutions. The limits on their freedom to speak can be illustrated by 
this quotation about the government: “They have a big burden, lots of youths and a big population. 
It is not only about the Palestinians. I am angry, but I sympathize with them sometimes.” (Interview 
Cairo 2009). The interviewee is expressing her frustration with the situation and with the 
government, but at the same time she is careful not to criticize them. This care has its root in the 
experiences of the Palestinian community. They have been told that their group constitute a security 
risk on numerous occasions, like in passport checks and army regulations, and the Palestinian 
community as a whole has experienced numerous arrest sweeps in periods when they have been 
politically active (ElAbed 2009, Interviewees Cairo 2009). So even though it is the Egyptian 
government, and to a certain extent the leadership in the PLO-institutions, that have created the 
many difficult situations that my interviewees were more than happy to tell me about, they could 
not direct their criticism and frustration towards the government. On the other hand it was very easy 
to criticize the Israeli authorities for not letting them return to their home-land. This was a way they 
could easily direct their frustration and feel that they were making a difference. By working on their 
own identity, and continuously emphasize their Palestinian nationality, they were opposing Israeli 
politics.  
Several interviewees were afraid that Israel was trying to wipe out the Palestinians by 
wiping out their culture. This is in line with the discourse of "belonging as nationality", because by 
wiping out the Palestinian culture, they wipe out what makes up the Palestinian nation, thus wiping 
out the nation itself and the nation's right to a territory. Both the GUPWom and the PRCS is 
working with preserving the culture, through their folkloric groups, and through employing people 
to make traditional Palestinian handicrafts. Some of the younger people expressed that they lost 
hopes in politics, and one of the stated that: "It's not about the land anymore. The land is known to 
be stolen, but our culture is very important." (Interview Cairo 2009). By being as Palestinian as 
possible, they were proving that they belong in Palestine, in a way that is accepted within the 
discourse of "belonging as nationality", and in this way they oppose Israel's presentation of 
historical Palestine as an empty land. Even though there is nothing much that can be done about the 
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conflict by one single individual, by keeping and spreading their culture they can try to spread 
attention about their case and their problems, and let the world know that they exist. It was also 
important in their personal lives, because it opposed the feeling of powerlessness that was so 
common among my interviewees. There is not much one of them, as an individual, can do in order 
to make a difference in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but by keeping their identity they felt that 
they were trying, and by doing what they can at least they ease their consciousness and add some 
meaning to their lives (Interviews Cairo 2009).  
 Even though it is difficult to work with their situation in Egypt, and much easier to criticize 
the Israeli government, the emphasis among my interviewees on telling me about all the difficulties 
in their daily life illustrates that working with their situation in Egypt is also very important. Many 
of my interviewees found it unfair that they were treated as guests. They: “are not here out of our 
own free will, so the rules should be different for us"(Interview Cairo 2009). This statement 
emphasizes the fact that the Palestinians are not guests that can leave if they do not like the host. In 
addition their long stay should disqualify them as guests, because no-one should be condemned to 
live their whole lives as guests, with the lack of rights following from that. A clear wish from many 
of my interviewees, especially the stateless and the ones that lacked the finances necessary to live a 
good life as foreigners in Egypt, was to have Egyptian citizenship. Only as citizens can they secure 
their rights as nationals in a legal context, and only as citizens can they avoid being represented as 
guests. Giving the Palestinians in Egypt citizenship would represent a very small incline in the 
Egyptian population, and would give massive benefits to the Palestinians, but the opposition against 
giving them citizenship is still huge, both from the Egyptian government and from some parts of the 
Palestinian leadership. We have already seen that the right of Palestinians to return to Palestine is 
given as the main reason not to give Palestinians Egyptian citizenship, but I believe there is another 
reason that is important to Palestinian leadership. Although this was never told me directly, I believe 
the Palestinian leadership is afraid that the enthusiasm for fighting the Palestinian cause would be 
significantly diminished among Palestinians if they got Egyptian citizenship. By gaining 
citizenship, they would start seeing themselves more as Egyptians, and less as Palestinians and thus 
identify themselves less with the Palestinian cause. In other words, they are afraid that the 
willingness to fight for the Palestinian cause is not big enough, and because of this they want as 
many people as possible to be born with the "obligation" to fight for the cause. 
 The traditional Palestinian organizations only organizes people with Palestinian decent. 
Because of their control over the PLO-institutions their leaders have some power over these people, 
but not over other supporters of the Palestinian cause. People of non-Palestinian descent have 
nowhere to go to support the Palestinian cause, however the popular support for the cause is big in 
Egypt. The cause is seen as a just cause, and the outcome of the Palestinian struggle is also 
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important in determining how we want our world to be. The cause has earlier been an important 
root for mass-mobilization in Egypt, and could very well become so again (Interviews and 
observation, Cairo 2009). 
 That is probably also why the Palestinians are seen as a security risk by the Egyptian 
authorities. People could be drawn towards the Palestinian cause of their own free will, because 
they see it as a just cause, but the potential for mass-mobilization is very dangerous for the sitting 
regime. In order to make such mass-mobilization possible it is necessary to work within Egypt for a 
democratization of the regime. The country has been ruled with emergency-laws since the murder 
of Sadat in 1981, and any political organization outside of the established political parties is strictly 
forbidden. Under the emergency laws the organizers of any event collecting more than a few people 
are obligated to notify the national security, and any such meeting would most likely be forbidden. 
All demonstrations are also forbidden, and they often turn violent as the security forces intervene. 
The organizers of demonstrations are usually prosecuted (ElAbed 2009, interviews Cairo 2009). By 
a democratization of the whole of Egypt the Palestinian people, as well as the rest of the Egyptian 
people, would benefit, and at the same time it would be opening the way for fighting the Palestinian 
cause much more effectively. 
 
Not many of my interviewees accept the discourse of “belonging as nationality” completely, but it 
still has a real impact on their lives. Yet, because "belonging as nationality" is a  is socially 
constructed discourse, it can be socially deconstructed and made socially irrelevant. When 
accepting "belonging as nationality", nationality becomes the only relevant factor in deciding where 
people have a right to live through where they belong. But by looking at belonging without seeing it 
through a nationalist discourse, other factors become just as relevant. For example all of my 
interviewees have a clear belonging in Egypt. They have lived in Egypt for a long time, many of 
them for the whole of their lives. They speak the Egyptian variant of Arabic, and many of them 
have been going to Egyptian schools. In addition they have a big part of their social network in 
Egypt, and many other kinds of immovable assets, such as for example jobs or school enrolment. 
 At the same time most of my interviewees clearly belong in Palestine. They all have one or 
more parents or grandparents from Palestine, many of them have friends and relatives in Palestine, 
and some of them still have strong connections to specific places within Palestine. 
 These people belong both in Palestine and in Egypt, and their belonging to both places can 
easily be proved without even mentioning nationality. Today they are not fully accepted in any of 
these countries, and the discourse of "belonging as nationality" makes it impossible for them to be 
so. But by moving away from this discourse, the Palestinians could be given the opportunity to 
choose for themselves where to live by proving their belonging to that place in terms of other 
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factors than nationality.  
 For those who feel that they belong in Egypt and want to live there, it is possible to continue 
their engagement for the Palestinian cause with an Egyptian citizenship. Their actual ties to 
Palestine will still be there, and it might even be easier for them to work with the cause, because 
they will not be identified as security risks through their ID-papers. In addition the Palestinian cause 
is a just cause that many people are willing to fight for because it is about how they want the world 
to be, not about their own connection to Palestine. Many Egyptians have strong feelings about the 
Palestinian cause even though they do not have any personal ties to Palestine.  
 
The discourse of "belonging as nationality" has a great impact on the daily life of my interviewees. 
Most of them are experiencing it through a lack of citizenship, which has severe consequences for 
them both when staying in Egypt and on their attempts to travel to other countries. Stateless people 
lack basic rights such as the right to a place to live, work and education, and they always run the 
risk of being subjected to detention if they cannot obtain a residence permit in the country where 
they are living.  
 Being stateless can also lead to a profound feeling of not belonging anywhere. When a group 
of migrants is rejected by the authorities in both the home-land and the host-country, it has sever 
emotional consequences for the individuals affected. In order to cope with the feeling of not 
belonging in Egypt, many of my interviewees emphasized their sense of belonging in Palestine. 
Their position as guests in Egypt made it difficult to complain about the conditions of their stay, and 
their vulnerable position to the Egyptian government made it impossible to pursue effective 
criticism of the government regulations. This left Israel as the obvious target for their frustration. It 
was the foundation of Israel and the subsequent conflicts that drove them out of their home-land and 
caused them to loose their assets and rights, and it is Israel's denial to let them return that have left 
them in their current position. In order for them to resist Israel's construction of them as simply 
Arabs, that do not have any claims to the land where Israel was founded, they have emphasized 
their Palestinian nationality. They have retained the Palestinian folklore and cultural heritage in 
order to show the world that they are Palestinians that belong in Palestine. And in the Palestinian 
institutions they have found a fellowship that enables them to feel less alone with their problems. 
 But even though opposition to Israel was their primary way to lift their frustration, their 
stories illustrated several grievances with the Egyptian government. And even though this is a much 
more dangerous target for their frustration some of my interviewees expressed a wish to work 
against the government and towards a more democratic Egypt. 
94 
 
Chapter 7: 
Conclusion 
This thesis has been concerned with discursive practices that equal belonging to nationality, and the 
consequences of that for a Palestinian community in Egypt. It have sought to answer the following 
research question. 
 How is the discourse of “belonging as nationality” experienced and used within a Palestinian 
community in Egypt? 
In the theory chapter I discussed the discourses around nationalism, and highlighted the concepts of 
home-land and host-country as highly important for forming migrant identity. Migrants are often 
met with conceptions of home-land and home-country, and expectations to behave like guests in 
their countries of residence. This makes it difficult to complain about bad conditions, even for 
second and third generation immigrants. Because belonging is often constructed as depending 
exclusively on nationality, people that are living outside of their national home-land can sometimes 
experience a lack of belonging in their countries of residence. This feeling is often attributed to 
rootlessness as a consequence of moving away from the national home-country, and these sorts of 
interpretations can often hide other issues that keeps the migrants from settling in their new 
countries of residence. 
 
Chapter 4, A Background on Palestinians in Egypt, introduced the case in my study. The history of 
the conflict between Israel and Palestine has had a big impact on Palestinians in Egypt. Both parts 
in the conflict have been utilizing elements from the discourse of "belonging as nationality", and the 
construction of the Palestinian nation have been a major source of disagreement. While Zionists 
have attempted to construct all Arabs as belonging to the same nation thus disqualifying the 
Palestinian claims to historical Palestine, the Arab states have refused to integrate Palestinians in 
their countries and insisted that they belong only in Palestine. In Egypt this was accompanied by a 
military conflict with Israel that resulted in the wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973 and several smaller 
confrontations, but since Egypt signed the Camp David Agreements in 1979 they have abolished 
any attempts at winning a military confrontation against Israel. They still retain that Palestinian 
belong in Palestine and cannot be allowed complete integration to Egypt, but their efforts towards 
freeing Palestine by force have failed. 
 
Chapter 5, The political construction of host-country and home-land, explores the following sub 
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research-question: 
 How has the discourse of "belonging as nationality" been used to describe and determine the 
relations of Palestinians living in Egypt to Palestine and Egypt? 
Throughout their lives, Palestinians in Egypt have been told again and again that they do not belong 
in Egypt. They have not always been told so directly, but much more important is the messages that 
they get through the laws and regulations that are governing their lives. Every time they are treated 
different because of their nationality, this strengthens their feeling that they do not belong. When 
they have to apply for resident permits or work permits, or when they have to pay extra school-fees 
they are constructed as guests that could leave any time they wish, even though they have nowhere 
else to go. 
 Their exclusion have always been grounded in their Palestinian nationality, and many of 
them want to go back to the place where they are told that they belong, but in the attempt to go 
back, they have to face another authority that tell them that they do not belong there either. They are 
effectively blocked from both visiting and settling in Palestine because they are denied the 
necessary permits from the Israeli government. 
 At the same time not all of them want to go back, and a lot of them want to go back only to 
the places where their families originally came from. This illustrates that the dream of return is not 
as homogeneous as it is sometimes portrayed. When listening to the leaders of the PLO-institutions 
in Cairo, it is easy to get the impression that all Palestinians in Egypt would leave everything in 
order to go to Palestine if they were only allowed to do so by the Israeli government. However my 
study shows that this is not the case. Not everybody wants to return. Some of my interviewees made 
it very clear that they have their whole life in Egypt. This is where they have their houses, their jobs 
and their friends, and those are things they are not willing to give up. Among those who wanted to 
return, they always made it clear that their return was contingent on certain factors. They need a 
place to stay, a guaranteed income and a safe environment, basic assets that all people need and that 
few would willingly go without. For some this is accompanied by a wish to return to the families’ 
original lands. They wanted back the things their families lost when fleeing, and so the dream of 
return was not about some general romantic notion of going back to their home-country. If they 
cannot go back to their original lands and have back their assets there, they can just as well stay in 
Cairo, where they have built their present lives. 
 Peteet (2007) described the dream of return not as a dream of going back to the home-land, 
but as a dream of getting back what they lost when they were forced to move. It is a dream of 
justice and recognition of their rights, a sense of belonging in the place where they live, and a safe 
place to build their lives. For some the dream of return can also represent a threat. At the same time 
as they want to fulfil their obligations to their country, the uncertainty about where they are going to 
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have their future are scaring them. This makes it more difficult to invest in the lives they are living 
today, because they risk losing everything if the Egyptian government decides that they have to 
return to Palestine. 
 
Chapter 6, Living in between, and the struggle for belonging, is discussing the question: 
 How are my interviewees experiencing and reacting to “belonging as nationality” in their 
daily lives? 
On one level, the discourse of “belonging as nationality” is something that was forced on my 
interviewees from above. They did not have a choice themselves to decide whether they belong in 
Palestine or Egypt by themselves. They were told by the Egyptian authorities that they do not 
belong in Egypt, and they were told by the Israeli authorities that they do not belong in Israel, both 
sides claiming their nationality as the reason. Because they were denied the opportunity to settle as 
citizens in both countries, many of them have ended up stateless. As well as creating formal 
difficulties, such as lack of basic rights and problems when attempting to cross international 
borders, statelessness can create a profound sense of not belonging anywhere. For my interviewees, 
their Palestinian nationality, and the belonging in Palestine that follows from it, became a comfort 
when they felt as outsiders in Egypt. Through their nationality they had something that Egyptians 
did not have. They learned about Palestinian folklore and culture and some of them learned the 
Palestinian language, and they were proud of their Palestinian heritage. But most importantly, 
Palestine represented a fellowship with other people that experienced the same marginalization in 
their daily life and a place for resisting Israel and the lack of justice they experienced as a result of 
leaving Palestine. 
At the same time as my interviewees used some elements from the discourse, they rejected others. 
Their frustration with the situation was evident from the stories they told me, and they were sick of 
being treated as guests in the country they had lived all their lives. They wanted to be recognized as 
citizens, either in a peaceful Palestine, or in the Egypt where they grew up. They wanted equal 
rights and they wanted compensation for the injustice that they and their families have suffered. 
 
The discourse of "belonging as nationality" is experienced by Palestinians in Egypt through the 
laws and regulations that are utilizing the discourse. For the lawmakers it is a question of winning 
an ideological contest over where the Palestinians belong, but for the Palestinians in Egypt this has 
resulted in extensive marginalization and feelings of not belonging. The Palestinians in the 
community in centre of my analysis are also using elements from the discourse actively in order to 
interpret their experiences. They are bound to the discourse through their involvement in the PLO-
institutions, but they are resisting central elements in the discourse in other situations. Two issues 
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are especially central in my case. The first issue is the dream about returning to Palestine. Palestine 
represents what was lost to my interviewees when they were forced to leave the country, and the 
dream of return is also a dream of justice. Regarding this issue, the whole community uses the 
discourse of "belonging as nationality" to justify their claims to the land and forward their fight for 
justice. The second issue is their wish for Egyptian citizenship. This wish is not uniform throughout 
the community. It is stronger among those who are struggling with the consequences of 
statelessness every day, and weaker among those who do not feel these problems in their own lives. 
It is directly opposed by those who are leading the struggle to return to Palestine and at the same 
time do not experience the problems of being stateless themselves. The last group is utilizing the 
discourse of "belonging as nationality" to claim that the first group will lose their Palestinian 
nationality if they obtain Egyptian citizenship. The first group is more concerned with their day to 
day problems. Those who argue that Palestinian should be allowed Egyptian citizenship argues that 
this would not alter their nationality, on the contrary their lack of Egyptian citizenship might make 
them hide their Palestinian nationality in order to avoid trouble. 
Because belonging is often constructed as depending exclusively on nationality, people that 
are living outside of their national home-land can sometimes experience a lack of belonging in their 
countries of residence. This feeling is often attributed to rootlessness as a consequence of moving 
away from the national home-country, and these sorts of interpretations can often hide other issues 
that keeps the migrants from settling in their new countries of residence. 
 
My study of a Palestinian community in Egypt serves to demonstrate how important discourses are 
in forming the lives of the people that are subjected to the discourses. Through laws and regulations, 
as well as through norms for behaviour, discourses have an enormous impact on the lives of people 
that have no real say in the formation of these discourses. Discourses can be used by different 
authorities to fight ideological battles, and to the degree that this is done the authorities have to 
make sure that all their actions are supporting their own discourse. This can be an important reason 
for governments to ignore the needs of their peoples for shorter or longer periods of time. When 
people become reduced to actors in politically contested discourses there is a serious danger that 
important legislations governing their lives might be altered by events totally out of their own 
control. 
 Nationalist discourses have long had a hegemonic status when it comes to describing the 
division of the world into territories ruled by different groups, and the nation-state has been the 
primary unit in this division. In addition belonging has often been interpreted within a nationalist 
perspective as being determined solely by nationality. Cross national migration is challenging this 
interpretation, and it becomes more and more common to accept that home-lands can be changed 
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and belonging can develop over time. My study has illustrated the many problems that arises from 
interpreting belonging as something dependent on an eternal homeland that cannot be changed. 
Increased migration and new criteria for belonging might also challenge the hegemony of the 
nation-state as the only possible unit for dividing the world into sovereign countries. Many present 
nations fit the criteria of the nation-state badly, and this discrepancy is likely to increase as a 
consequence of increased migration. I have also argued that nations should not be seen as 
homogeneous units, but rather as something diverse and consisting of many sub-groups. Other 
writers have argued that globalization has rendered the nation a less relevant unit, and that super-
regional and sub-regional units are becoming more important. 
 
I have argued that nationality is a very central concept in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that the 
conflict can be constructed in a very simplified way as a conflict over two different nations' right to 
inhabit and govern a territory. The centrality of "nationality as belonging" in the treatment of 
Palestinians in Egypt by both the Egyptian and the Israeli authorities seems to strengthen this 
argument. If this is true, the impact on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict might be very important. If we 
understand the conflict as a conflict about nationality, then a possible solution might be to construct 
a new state in historical Palestine that is not depending on nationality. A two-state solution, like the 
one that was proposed in the Oslo-agreements can never fulfil the Palestinian dream of return, 
because it does not give justice to those who have their family ties in present day Israel. A real 
solution must allow the refugees to return to their original lands, but my study, as well as other 
studies on Palestinians in exile, have suggested that the amounts of Palestinians that would actually 
return if this was possible will be quite limited. For those who do not want to return, a solution to 
the conflict must ensure their rights to full integration in their host-countries. In this way belonging 
will not be determined by a political contest over different discourses, but rather by a choice taken 
individually by everybody that is affected. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
The interview guide consist of 5 main questions. These questions are open questions that I asked all 
the interviewees. I used the rest of the questions to keep the conversation going if the interviewees 
did not know what to say, or as a reminder to myself about relevant follow up questions. I did not 
use the exact same wording of the question that I have written down. Because I tried to keep the 
interviews conversation like, I could not depend on using the exact same phrasing every time. 
 
1. Can you tell me about your Palestinian background? What makes you a Palestinian? 
a. Are you from Palestine yourself, or is your family from Palestine? 
b. When did you/they leave Palestine? Why? 
c. Why did you/they choose to come to Egypt? 
2. How was it (for them) to come to Egypt/ how is it to live in Egypt? 
a. How was it to find a job? 
b. Did you need a work permit? What about residence permit? 
c. Legal status, refugee, citizen? Egyptian documents. 
d. What about your education? School fees? 
e. What do you think about the Egyptian government? 
f. What do you think about the Egyptian people? 
g. Other opinions about Egypt? 
3. Is it important to keep a strong Palestinian community in Egypt? Why? 
a. Are you involved with any Palestinian groups? Why? Why not? 
b. What are you doing in this group?  
c. Is this group important for you? Why? 
d. Is the group important for the Palestinian community in Egypt? Why? How? 
4. Can you tell me about your relation to Palestine? 
a. Have you ever been visiting Palestine? 
b. What papers did you need to go there? 
c. Do you want to visit Palestine (again)? Why? Why not? 
d. What papers will you need to go there? 
e. Do you want to live in Palestine? Why? Why not Can you? 
f. Will it be possible for you to live in Palestine in the future? 
5. Can you tell me about your relation to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict? 
a. Is it affecting your daily life today? How? 
b. Are you involved in any work related to the conflict? Why? Why not? How? 
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c. Can your life in Egypt affect the Palestinian conflict in any way? How?/Why not? 
d. Can anything people in Egypt do make a difference? How?/ Why not? 
e. Does it make a difference for the Palestinian cause if you keep your Palestinian 
identity or try to become Egyptian? 
f. Is there anything specific that is affecting your relation to the conflict? 
6. Is there anything else you want to tell me? 
